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What Is Criminal Restitution?
Cortney E. Lollar
ABSTRACT: A new form of restitution has become a core aspect of criminal
punishment. Courts now order defendants to compensate victims for an
increasingly broad category of losses, including emotional and psychological
losses and losses for which the defendant was not found guilty. Criminal
restitution therefore moves far beyond its traditional purpose of disgorging a
defendant's ill-gotten gains. Instead, restitution has become a mechanism of
imposing additional punishment. Courts, however, have failed to recognize
the punitive nature of restitution and thus enter restitution orders without
regard to the constitutional protections that normally attach to criminal
proceedings. This Article deploys a novel definition of punishment to situate
restitution alongside other forms of punishment. As with other forms of
punishment, courts impose restitution subsequent to a criminal allegation,
pursuant to a statute motivated by morally condemnatory intent, and
resulting in a substantial deprivation or obligation. Because restitution has
become aform of punishment, this Article argues that judges should recognize
criminal restitution for what it is-victim compensation imposed at the state's
request as condemnation for a moral wrong-and extend to defendants in
restitution proceedings all the constitutional protections they enjoy in other
criminal proceedings. This means submitting restitution to a jury for
determination pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, and subjecting it to the
excessive fines analysis of the Eighth Amendment.
* Assistant Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I am grateful to Joshua
Barnette, Scott Bauries, William Berry, Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Jim Donovan, Josh Douglas, Keith
Findley, Brian Frye, Nicole Huberfeld, Peter Joy, Andrew Kull, Wayne Logan, Michael Pinard,
Melynda Price, Laura Rosenbury, Collin Schueler, and Sarah Welling for their thoughtful
comments, insights and suggestions. Thank you to Mae Quinn for planting the seed for this
Article, to Franklin Runge for helping locate difficult-to-find sources, and to the editors of the
Iowa Law Review-particularly Nick De La Cruz and MacKenzie Benson-for their excellent
editorial work. This Article benefitted greatly from participants in the Clinical Law Review
Clinical Writers' Workshop, Washington University School of Law Junior Faculty Workshop,
SEALS New Scholar Workshop, and feedback from the faculties at the University of Cincinnati
College of Law and the University of Kentucky College of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core
component of criminal punishment. Both the manner in which courts impose
restitution and the implications of failing to pay criminal restitution illustrate
restitution's increasingly punitive character. Take the following three
examples:
First, a defendant is convicted of wire fraud and sentenced to serve a
period of time in prison. As part of the sentence, the judge also orders the
defendant to pay $40,000 in restitution to those he defrauded. The defendant
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completes his prison term and all other court-ordered obligations but is
unable to earn the money to pay the restitution. Because of the unpaid
restitution, the state deems the criminal sentence incomplete and continues
to prohibit the defendant from voting.,
Second, a janitorial supervisor at the post office in downtown Fargo,
North Dakota, takes undeliverable BMG Columbia House CDs and DVDs
from the post office trash and sells them. The disks were discarded as part of
an agreement between BMG and the postal service, as it was less costly for
BMG to produce replacement disks than to pay for the return of the
undeliverable disks. After being charged in federal court with felony mail
theft, the defendant pleads guilty to a misdemeanor charge and is ordered to
pay restitution to BMG in the amount of his sales, even though BMG has
suffered no financial loss.-
Third, a police officer responds to a call and attempts to arrest the
suspect at the scene. The suspect flees in his car. The officer radios for
assistance. Another officer, on duty but at home, sets out to help catch the
fleeing suspect. On her way to assist the first officer, the second officer is
involved in a single car accident that completely destroys her patrol car. At
sentencing for eluding the first officer, the defendant is ordered to pay
$22,509 in restitution to the police department to cover the costs of the
second officer's patrol vehicle, even though the defendant was not
responsible for her accident.3
Each of these cases illustrates how criminal restitution has become part
of the larger retributive objective of the American criminal justice system. In
each instance, the court issued an order as part of a criminal case that creates
a legally binding obligation between the defendant and the state. Legislatures
create-and courts impose-this legal obligation, in part, to convey the moral
condemnation associated with criminal punishment. These cases reveal how
the practical effects of criminal restitution are no different from the practical
effects of a criminal fine, an undisputable form of criminal punishment. They
also exemplify scenarios that require criminal defendants to pay restitution
even when the victim has suffered no tangible loss, or the loss is only indirectly
related to the defendant's criminal action. Finally, these examples show how
criminal restitution is rarely used to disgorge a defendant's unlawful gain, but
more often is calculated to compensate a victim's loss, often resulting in a
benefit previously unknown to the victim.
Although it has become a regular part of a criminal defendant's
sentencing, courts do not afford criminal restitution any of the constitutional
i. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F. 3 d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
29-202(b)-(c) (2014)).
2. United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3 d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the
restitution order was vacated on appeal due to the government's failure to put forth evidence of
actual loss).
3. Dubois v. People, 211 P.3 d 41, 4 2 (Co0. 2009) (en banc).
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checks they normally provide punishment. In fact, many courts disavow the
idea that criminal restitution is an instrument for punishment, instead
characterizing restitution as solely compensatory. The result is consistent
imposition of a form of criminal punishment without the constitutional
protections the Sixth and Eighth Amendments afford defendants.4
Restitution has long been an available criminal remedy in the United
States,5 but courts only have imposed criminal restitution in a primarily
condemnatory manner over the past decade. Rooted in the vigorous victims'
4. The Sixth Amendment affords the jury trial right to any finding that increases a
defendant's criminal punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Eighth Amendment limits the
financial penalties that can be imposed on a defendant as punishment in a criminal case. U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. Generally, these rights have not been, but should be, afforded to criminal
restitution findings as well.
5. Starting in 1925, federal judges were authorized to order restitution only as a condition
of probation. Woody R. Clermont, It's Never Too Late to Make Amends: Two Wrongs Don't Protect a
Victim'sRight to Restitution, 35 NOvAL. REV. 363, 373 (2011); see also, e.g., United States v. Boswell,
605 F.2d 171, 175 (5 th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wilson, 469 F.2d 368, 370 (2d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339, 341-42 (4 th Cir. 1963); cf Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395,
397-99 (1971) (explaining that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to convert the
statutory ceiling of a punishment from payment of a fine to imprisonment based solely on an
indigent defendant's inability to pay the fine (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-42
(1970))). During this era, only a few states also had provisions for restitution in their criminal
codes. See Note, Restitution and the CriminalLaw, g COLUM. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (1939). The most
common statutes required a defendant to return stolen property, or its equivalent value, to the
owner in addition to receiving a punishment of possible imprisonment or a fine. Id. at 1195 &
n.53 (citing statutes from D.C., Maryland, Pennsylvania). Other states had more elaborate
procedures for reparations, requiring an application to the court prior to an order for restitution
being entered. Id. at 1195-96 (citing statutes from Kentucky, Alabama, Nebraska, Arkansas and
Delaware); see also Bruce R. Jacob, Reparation or Restitution by the Criminal Offender to His Victim:
Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern Correctional Process, 61 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
152, 155 (1970); Marvin E. Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes ofPersonal Violence, 50 MINN.
L. REV. 223, 229 (1965)-
In 1982, at the height of the victims' rights movement, Congress passed the federal Victim
and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), introducing a new era for restitution. As a result of the
VWPA, for the first time, restitution became a common element in federal criminal sentencing.
Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of
1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (2009). In 1982, President Reagan's Task Force on Victims
of Crime published its final report, which encouraged judges to order restitution in "all cases in
which the victim has suffered financial loss, unless they state compelling reasons for a contrary
ruling on the record." PRESIDENT'S TASKFORCE ON VICrIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 73 (1982),
available at http://ojp.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf. In response to the
Task Force's Final Report, Congress passed the VWPA, which codified numerous
recommendations made in the report. Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the
Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the
Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2722 (2005); Thomas M.
Kelly, Note, Where Offenders Pay for Their Cimes: Victim Restitution and Its Constitutionality, 5 9 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 685, 685, 694 (1984); see also Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(C)(2)). Some states had enacted legislation authorizing, and even mandating,
restitution prior to i982.Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, Introduction, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SANCIONS 1, 2-4 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975).
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rights movement of the 1980s, legislators encouraged restitution's currently
accepted presence in criminal sentencing hearings, which corresponded with
society's progressively vengeful approach to criminal defendants and
punishment.6 The desire to "make victims whole" accompanies the desire,
figuratively and literally, to "make criminal defendants pay."
Along with the increasing use of restitution as a criminal remedy,
legislators and judges have transformed the method of calculating criminal
restitution. Courts no longer impose criminal restitution as a mechanism
aimed at disgorging unlawful gains, as restitution was created to do.7 Instead,
courts impose criminal restitution now to compensate for economic,
emotional, and psychological losses.8 As a result, criminal restitution has
become unmoored from the specific, tangible, and economic gains a
defendant unlawfully earned at the victim's expense. Courts no longer
require precise calculations. Rather, they employ "fudge factor[s]" to
determine the amount of restitution to impose in a given case.9 Thus, criminal
restitution has evolved from a primarily restorative mechanism to a primarily
punitive one. Whereas disgorgement is righting an economic imbalance,
punishment is compensation loosely tied to a criminal act and imposed as a
consequence of committing a moral wrong.
In order to identify when and how restitution operates as punishment, a
basic definition of what constitutes punishment is needed. This Article
articulates a new definition. Although the definition uses several previously
articulated delineations as a starting point, it expands from these anchors to
acknowledge the current increase in the use of punitive remedies, of which
restitution is but one. This Article defines punishment as a state action
subsequent to a criminal allegation, resulting in a substantial deprivation
and/or obligation, and imposed: (1) pursuant to a statute that reveals morally
condemnatory intent; (2) pursuant to a statute with unclear intent, but
applied in a consistently condemnatory manner; or (3) with the effect of
substantially diminishing a person's well-being as a result of the moral
condemnation communicated by the state action.
6. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); MARIE GOrrSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOws: THE
POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006);JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
CRIME: How THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE
OF FEAR (2007); MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN
PENAL CULTURE (2004); Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 259 (201 1).
7. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
8. Indeed, some statutes actually require judges to impose restitution for economic and
psychological losses. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 225 9 (b) (3 )(A), (F) (2012); id. § 3 66 3 (b) (2) (A). Federal
judges consistently have interpreted federal restitution statutes as measuring restitution by a victim's
losses rather than a defendant's unlawful gains. See infra Part l.A.




Applying this definition reveals that when restitution is imposed as a part
of sentencing in a criminal case, the restitution is punishment. As this Article
will discuss in more detail, criminal restitution is a substantial financial
obligation, as most criminal defendants are indigent. Courts impose criminal
restitution pursuant to a criminal conviction sought by the state, even when
the restitution imposed is for conduct beyond the scope of the conviction.
Criminal restitution is imposed in a manner conveying moral condemnation,
and pursuant to statutes that reveal condemnatory intent. The result is often
the substantial diminution of a person's well-being due to the moral
condemnation associated with the imposition of criminal restitution.
A closer look at how criminal restitution plays out in practice confirms its
punitive character. The most obvious indication that criminal restitution is
punishment is revealed by the consequences that attach to a defendant for
non-payment of restitution after release from prison. The collateral
consequences triggered by a failure to pay restitution mirror those that attach
to other criminal punishments, including continued disenfranchisement for
the inability to pay, preclusion from running for office, threat of further
incarceration if someone is unable to prove her failure to pay was not willful,
and suspension of one's driver's license.
Recent federal and state court opinions demonstrate the prevalence of
this punitive approach. For example, courts commonly order criminal
restitution for conduct for which the defendant has not been found guilty,
including acquitted conduct, conduct occurring outside the statute of
limitations, and conduct involving victims not named in the indictment. o In
other words, courts hold defendants financially liable for conduct for which
the defendants have not been found legally accountable. Even when a victim
suffers no financial loss, courts order restitution." Courts order criminal
restitution in instances where the loss is not directly attributable to the
defendant. Further, defendants across the country are regularly required to
pay for the costs of the government's investigation and prosecution of them,
often without any calculation as to what those costs actually are. 2
Courts are using criminal restitution to punish defendants, without
affording restitution the constitutional checks courts normally provide for
punishment. Judges are awarding large restitution orders uncorrelated to any
specific loss amount, for actions the government did not prove during the
criminal trial, and to individuals the defendant's crime did not directly harm,
without being constrained by any constitutional limitations. These large
monetary penalties keep people under increasingly indefinite periods of
criminaljustice supervision, resulting in a new type of debtors' prison. In turn,
the government uses restitution payments to fund the very law enforcement
1o. See infra Part III.B. i.
i1. See infra Part III.B.g.
1 2. See infra Part III.B.4-
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agencies that prosecuted them, raising numerous due process and equal
protection concerns.'3 Because courts impose criminal restitution as
punishment, courts should grant the constitutional protections afforded to
other forms of criminal punishment.
This Article begins in Part II by tracing the modern evolution of criminal
restitution. After addressing some of the concerns with the shift toward
restitution as a punitive rather than a compensatory device, the Article turns
to the issue of punishment. Part II offers a new definition of punishment, and
situates criminal restitution within the parameters of that definition. Part III
reveals the many ways in which restitution operates on the ground as a
primarily punitive device. In Part IV, the Article concludes by proposing that
courts recognize criminal restitution's growing role as an instrument of
punishment by providing defendants with the constitutional protections
consistent with that categorization.
II. THE RESTITUTION REVOLUTION
Over the past 30 years, the American criminal justice system has endured
a seismic shift in its treatment of alleged crime victims and offenders.
Influenced heavily by a robust victims' rights movement, public opinion has
shifted toward concern for victims in criminal proceedings, and legislative
responses reflect that trend. At the same time, those accused of committing
crimes have been subject to increasingly punitive responses, both in sentiment
and law.14 Retribution and incapacitation have become the prevailing
criminal justice goals. As a result, offenders face ever more severe
punishments, and the focus of criminal justice responses has shifted toward
victims.'5
The modern expansion of criminal restitution exemplifies this broader
shift. Traditionally, in both the civil and criminal contexts, courts used
restitution to financially restore a person economically damaged by another's
actions, thereby preventing the unintended beneficiary from being unjustly
enriched at the aggrieved party's expense.'6 With the shift toward
incorporating the victim into the criminal justice process, restitution became
a more common and prevalent mechanism utilized in criminal sentencing
13. Wayne Logan and Ronald Wright have discussed in more depth the concerns raised by
this type of system, including that "courts and other criminal justice actors become mercenaries,
in effect working on commission," equaljustice concerns, and the observation that "a government
that can fob off costs on criminals has an incentive to find criminals everywhere." Wayne A. Logan
& Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary CiminalJustice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1177-78 (quoting Kevin
Baker, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Why Prisoners Shouldn't Pay Their Debt, AM. HERITAGE MAG.,
June/July 2006, at 22, 22).
14. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Elmar Weitekamp, Can Restitution Serue As a Reasonable Alternative to Imprisonment?
An Assessment of the Situation in the USA, in REsTORATIvEJUSTICE ON TRIAL 81, 8 1-82 (Heinz Messmer
& Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992).
20 14] g9g
IOWA LAWREVIEW
hearings, as restoring the victim to her previous economic status was one way
of including her in that process.
Initially, courts imposed restitution in a manner consistent with this
original restorative purpose. In more recent years, however, restitution has
become the criminal version of civil damages. No longer do courts use
restitution solely to reimburse specific, concrete financial losses; now, courts
regularly impose restitution as compensation for abstract emotional and
psychological injuries.7 The result is significant doctrinal confusion and
incoherence, as restitution in the civil setting is a legal term of art that still
strictly refers to disgorgement of unlawful gains,'8 whereas in the criminal
context, "restitution" refers to what is more aptly termed "victim
compensation."'9 The continued use of the misnomer "criminal restitution"
17. "The new era for restitution began in 1982, with the passage of the federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act (VWPA)." Cortney E. Lollar, Child Pornography and the Restitution
Revolution, 103J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 34 3, 351 (2013); see also Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(C) (2)); Dickman, supra note 5, at 1688; Kleinhaus, supra note 5,
at 2722; Kelly, supra note 5, at 685, 694.
Under the VWPA, criminal restitution was no longer limited to repaying the victim the value
of money, goods, or services taken from them; restitution could now be ordered as compensation
for physical injuries, and as time went on, for mental injuries and emotional losses. For the first
time, under the VWPA, if the victim suffered bodily injury, the court could order a defendant to
pay for medical, psychiatric or psychological treatment, as well as reimburse the victim for wages
lost prior to sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3 5 7 9 (b) (2), (3) (1982) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3664
(2012)).
In addition to importing civil damages into the scope of losses compensable by criminal
restitution, Congress sought to make it easier for victims to prove civil damages in civil lawsuits
based on the same criminal acts for which a defendant already had been punished. An additional
provision of the VWPA prevented the defendant from "denying the essential allegations of that
offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State civil proceeding brought. . . by the
victim." 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2012)). Congress' aim was to
keep a person from having to prove a defendant's liability a second time as part of a civil tort suit.
S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 32 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516. If a victim received
compensation in a civil case, restitution payments could be offset against the damages ordered.
18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (currentversion at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2012)); Kelly, supranote 5, at 6g8.
In short, Congress seems to have been doing everything it could to allow crime victims to get
monetary payments to make up for their experiences, apparently viewing restitution as a type of
panacea.
In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") became the first federal statute to
mandate criminal restitution. This was a change from the VWPA, which allowed a court to decline
ordering restitution based on a defendant's indigency. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a) (2) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2012)). VAWA required convicted defendants to compensate victims for
physical and psychological injuries inflicted as a result of sex-related and domestic violence
crimes, regardless of the defendant's financial means. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, lo8 Stat. 1904 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (2012)).
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § I cmt. e(2) (201 1).
19. Recent proposed changes to the Model Penal Code, for example, have acknowledged
the confusion created by the use of the word "restitution" to describe two very different sets of
compensatory mechanisms. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.o 4 A cmt. a (Preliminary
Draft No. io, Sept. 3, 2014) (on file with author). As a result, the American Law Institute initially
[Vol. 100:931oo0
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deflects attention away from how significant a deviation the current usage is
from restitution's doctrinal roots. Beneath the veneer of identical language,
"restitution" in the criminal context has become a punitive mechanism
intended to compensate a broad range of victim's losses, quite distinct from
the traditional understanding of restitution as a vehicle for disgorgement of
unlawful gains, as it still operates in the civil realm.2o No longer is "criminal
restitution" measured by a defendant's unlawful gain; now, it is calculated
based on a victim's losses.
Because courts now measure criminal restitution by a victim's tangible
and abstract losses, restitution punishes an offender by holding her
responsible for actions and results not necessarily attributable to her. Courts
are imposing these restitution orders in the context of a criminal sentencing
hearing, where courts impose the restitution at the request of, and create an
obligation to, the state. Because the defendant is held accountable for actions
and results beyond the scope of the criminal conviction, a criminal restitution
order ends up being a state-sanctioned damages payment, often one that
cannot even arguably be aimed at "making the victim whole." Restitution
therefore comes to achieve retribution and punishment, rather than
reimbursement and restoration. The legislative history, language of the
primary restitution statutes, and application of those statutes each reveal a
retributive intent, confirming that restitution is now being employed as an
instrument of punishment.
A. CRIMINAL RESTITUTION'S SHIFrFROMDISGORGEMENT TO PUNISHMENT
The law's approach to criminal restitution has undergone a historic
evolution in the past 30 years. Previously, both civil and criminal restitution
consisted of the disgorgement of a wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, making
the defendant's gain the critical component of the analysis. For example, if a
defendant stole a victim's valuable watch and then sold it on the street, the
defendant would be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of the watch's
value. Now, courts no longer use criminal restitution solely to force a
proposed the adoption of the more accurate term "victim compensation" to describe what
practitioners and legislators refer to as "restitution." Id. Although approved at the 2014 Annual
Meeting, in the most recent Preliminary Draft, the Reporter has recommended maintaining the
term "restitution." See id. § 6.o 4 A cmt. b. This author fully endorses the adoption of the term
"victim compensation" and believes it is a more accurate description of what is erroneously called
"restitution." Because "victim compensation" is not yet recognized as a legal term of art in either
state and federal criminal law or common legal parlance, however, this Article continues to use
the outdated and misleading term "restitution," instead of "victim compensation." To distinguish
what occurs in criminal proceedings from civil restitution, this Article uses the term "criminal
restitution."
20. This shift in the legislatures' and courts' approach to criminal restitution is part of a
larger shift in the criminal justice system from theories of punishment that focus on a defendant's
blameworthiness to those that are more concerned with the harm a defendant's conduct has
caused. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 93, loo (9th ed. 2012).
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defendant to disgorge a profit wrongfully taken. With the criminal justice
system's shift toward focusing on the experience of the victim, legislators and
courts have broadened the concept of criminal restitution to require
compensation of a victim's loss rather than disgorgement of a defendant's
gain. In other words, criminal restitution is now principally concerned with
compensating the victim's injury. In fact, this approach to criminal restitution
has become the prevailing approach.21 Most courts find it is error to substitute
a defendant's gain for the amount of a victim's loss in calculating criminal
restitution,22 despite restitution's original goals. As a result, courts and
legislatures often provide victims with a financial benefit they did not
previously possess.
Along with the shift in focus from unjust enrichment toward victim loss,
legislatures and courts have begun to define "loss" more broadly. In the
context of criminal restitution, loss now encompasses a much wider range of
harms. Beyond reimbursing an economic loss, restitution orders currently
compensate for emotional, psychological, and hedonic harms-as well as for
expenses restitution did not previously reimburse, including costs victims
incur in hiring their own lawyers (since prosecutors represent the state), past
and future lost wages, and other financial losses previously deemed
"consequential damages."23
21. See, e.g., United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3 d 86, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[I]t was error for the
District Court to order restitution for the amount of Zangari's gain rather than the victims' actual
losses."); United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3 d 326, 341 (4 th Cir. 2oo8) ("[A]ny order of restitution
nevertheless must be based on sufficient evidence of the amount of actual loss incurred as a result
of the fraudulently obtained contract. Profit gained by the defendants may not be used in its
stead."); United States v. Arledge, 553 F-3 d 881, 899 (5 th Cir. 2008) ("We have held that the
amount of the [restitution] award must be tied to the losses suffered by victims of the defendant's
crime, not the defendant's gain from his illegal conduct."); United States v. Galloway, 5og F.3 d
1246, 1253 (soth Cir. 2007) ("[A] Ithough gain may be used to determine a defendant's offense
level under the Guidelines . .. it is not an appropriate estimate of loss when determining the
amount of restitution . . . ."); United States v. George, 403 F.3 d 470, 474 (7 th Cir. 2005)
("Restitution must be based on the victim's loss rather than the offender's gain."); United States
v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Although we have held supra that gross gain
is a valid measure of the loss attributable to this offense for purposes of guideline sentencing, a
restitution order, in contrast, must be limited to the amount of Elysian's loss as a result of
Badaracco's bank fraud.").
22. See, e.g., Zangar, 677 F. 3 d at 91; Harvey, 532 F-3 d at 341; Galloway, 5og F.3 d at 1253-54;
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 942-43.
23. Compare George, 403 F. 3 d at 474 ("'Loss' means direct injury, not consequential
damages."); United States v. Scott, 405 F.3 d 615, 620 (7 th Cir. 2005) ("[M]ost (though not all)
cases classify attorneys' fees incurred by a crime victim . . . as 'consequential damages' that are
therefore ineligible for restitution."); United States v. Sablan, 92 F. 3 d 865, 870 (gth Cir. 1996)
(stating that consequential expenses should be excluded from restitution order); United States
v. Mullins, 971 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4 th Cir. 1992) ("[A]n award of restitution under the VWPA
cannot include consequential damages such as attorney's and investigators' fees expended to
recover the property."); United States v. Diamond, 969 F.2d 961, g6 8 (ioth Cir. 1992)
("Numerous courts have held the VWPA does not authorize consequential damages such as
attorney's fees and expenses as part of restitution."); United States v. Sharp, 927 F.2d 170, 174
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The range of harms now covered by criminal restitution has begun to
reach its outer limits, as criminal restitution has become unmoored from the
harms directly attributable to the defendant's conviction conduct. Having
already expanded the losses for which a victim could seek compensation from
economic to psychological and hedonic, the only way to increase the financial
proceeds a victim can receive is to broaden the range of behaviors attributable
to a defendant. In the past few years, legislators, courts, and victims have done
just that, pushing the limits of what reasonably can be considered losses
attributable to a defendant. As this Article will discuss further in Part III,
courts now commonly order criminal restitution for acquitted conduct,
conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations, and to victims not named
in the Indictment. Defendants also have been ordered to pay the government
for the costs of the investigation and prosecution of their own cases. In other
words, if any person or any conduct is even tangentially related to a case, a
court can order a defendant to pay restitution as part of criminal sentencing,
even if the defendant's conviction itself did not cover that victim or conduct.
Federal courts rely on the language of the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act ("MVRA"), a federal statute enacted in 1996, as authorization for criminal
restitution's new scope. The MVRA made restitution mandatory in all federal
criminal cases with an "identifiable victim."=4 The MVRA also requires judges
(4 th Cir. 199g) (stating that lost income should not be included in restitution order); United
States v. Koenig, 952 F.2d 267, 275 (gth Cir. 1991) (explaining that a reward granted to an
informant is not restitution); and United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (5 th Cir.
1989) (expressing that no authority under VWAPA to authorize restitution for lost income or cost
of employing counsel to recover losses from insurance company), with In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3 d
5g, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating attorneys' fees subject to restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 1593
(2012)); United States v. Amato, 540 F-3 d 153, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2oo8) (stating that restitution
can include attorneys' fees, accounting costs and expenses associated with investigation or
prosecution "of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense"); United Sates
v. DeRosier, 501 F. 3 d 888, 897 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding inclusion of attorneys' fees and
investigative costs as part of restitution order under MVRA); United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d
1044, 1056-57 (9 th Cir. 2004) (ruling investigative costs and attorneys' fees recoverable as
restitution); United States v. Hayward, 359 F. 3 d 631, 642 (3 d Cir. 2004) (upholding investigative
costs under the MVRA); United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding attorneys' fees recoverable as restitution when incurred as investigation cost).
A recent federal restitution provision applicable in the context of forced labor cases requires
offenders to pay ill-gotten gains andvictim's losses. 18 U.S.C. § 15 9 3 (b)( 3 ) (2012) (requiring a
defendant to pay "full amount of victim's losses" and in addition, "the greater of the gross income
or value to the defendant of the victim's services or labor or the value of the victim's labor as
guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards
Act"); see also In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3 d at 66.
24. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). Regardless of a defendant's ability to pay, restitution is now
required not only for all crimes in which "a victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or
pecuniary loss," but also for victims of sex-related and domestic violence crimes as well. Id. In
2000, certain drug crimes were added to the list. See Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
1o6-310, 114 Stat. 1230 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3 66 3A(c)(i)(A)(ii)). Ifa person
leases or rents property for the purpose of manufacturing,,distributing or using drugs, or makes
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to order restitution for the "full amount of each victim's losses."25 Seizing on
a poorly worded paragraph of the statute, attorneys for crime victims argued
convincingly that "proximate cause" between the defendant's act and the
victim's loss was not required for restitution; rather, restitution could be
ordered for any harm that is a "proximate result" of a crime.26 Although the
Supreme Court in Paroline v. United States recently rejected the "proximate
result" standard, it embraced a new standard for determining the proper
scope of criminal restitution.7 Interpreting the MVRA, the Court found
where "it is impossible to trace a particular amount" of a victim's losses to a
defendant "by recourse to a more traditional causal inquiry," a lower court
"should order restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant's
relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim's general losses."28
A sentencing court "must assess as best it can from available evidence the
significance of the individual defendant's conduct in light of the broader
causal process that produced the victim's losses" using "discretion and sound
judgment."29 A precise mathematical inquiry or algorithm is "neither
necessary nor appropriate."3o
With the Court's holding, it endorsed an expansive range of losses for
which a defendant can be held financially responsible. Now, courts can hold
a defendant accountable for an "arbitrary" amount of losses dependent on
whatever the judge determines to be a defendant's "relative culpability."s'
This is in addition to defendants already being ordered to pay criminal
restitution for unproven allegations, costs borne by people who are only
tangentially connected to crime victims, and consequences resulting from
conduct for which a defendant has been affirmatively acquitted32
Even with these fundamental changes to criminal restitution, the
question remains whether this conceptual shift truly transforms restitution
from a restorative remedy to a punitive one. After all, the fact that restitution
property available for any of those purposes, she can be required to reimburse the owner of the
property for any damage to the property, or value of the property, caused by the making or selling
of drugs there. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 856.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3 66 4 (f) () (A). VAWA likewise has a similarly worded restitution statute. See
id. § 159 3 (b) (i) ("The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay
the victim ... the full amount of the victim's losses.").
26. See In re Amy Unknown, 701 F-3 d 749, 752 (5 th Cir. 2012) (en banc), overruled by
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014). The Supreme Court recently decided this
narrow issue: "What, if any, causal relationship or nexus between the defendant's conduct and
the victim's harm or damages must the government or victim establish in order to recover
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259." Paroline v. United States, 13 3 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (mem.).
27. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1727.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1727-28.
30. Id. at 1728.
31. Id. at 1734 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
32. See infta Part III.B.1.
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historically was concerned with disgorgement does not mean it cannot now
be broadened to encompass compensation.ss
B. PUNISHMENT DEFINED
In order to identify when and how restitution is operating as punishment,
judges and practitioners need a common definition of what constitutes
punishment. Although one might suppose punishment is something we know
when we see it, punishment's legal boundaries remain elusive. Most can agree
on a basic premise-punishment is suffering or pain, often in the form of
deprivation, imposed on a person by a legal authority in response to an action
she committed or failed to commit-but beyond this general starting point,
views diverge.34
Many scholars have contemplated what constitutes punishment, but
despite the emergence of numerous theories, consensus remains elusive. For
example, do we defer to the legislature in deciding whether an offender's
action is deemed a crime requiring punishment? Do we look to the degree of
33. The issue is not solely one of language. If one solely was concerned about word choice,
given that "restitution" has a particular legal meaning historically, arguably we could simply
change the terminology-stop calling the monetary penalty imposed as part of criminal
sentencing "restitution" and call it "victim compensation" instead. Although this would be a start,
the conceptual expansion from reimbursement to punishment goes beyond a simple change in
terminology. Even if we were to start calling what judges impose in the criminal context "victim
compensation," this verbal slight of hand does not change the fundamental nature of the practice
from punitive to restorative. Thanks to Hillary Sale and Andrew Kull for, in different ways,
identifying this issue.
34. CompareJohn Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009)
(discussing role in adaptation),John Bronsteen et al., Retribution and the Experience of Punishment,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463. 1464 (2oo) (noting "adaptation is relevant to punishment"), Adam J.
Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141 (2013) (conceptualizing
punishment as "harsh treatment" subjectively experienced), Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative
Nature ofPunishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565, 1594, 16o6 (2oog) (stating that punishment consists
of "liberty deprivations" and "distressing experiences" and is largely "experiential" and
subjective), and AdamJ. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, lo9 COLUM. L. REV. 182,
184-87 (2oog) (claiming punishment should "take subjective experiences into account"), with
Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, g2 B.U. L. REV. 577, 578 n.1 (2012) (stating punishment
includes "all legally facilitated responses driven by moral outrage"), Vincent Chiao, Punishment
and Permissibility in the Criminal Law, 32 LAW & PHIL. 729, 732 (2013) (measuring punishment by
the objective impact on fundamental interests), David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1619, 1664 (2010) ("[Plunishment is the objectively determined, logical consequence of a
crime imposed upon an offender by the state."), Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology:
The New Path of.Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2483 (1997) ("By selecting an affliction of the
appropriate form and severity, the community expresses condemnation of the wrongdoer and
reaffirms its commitment to the values that the wrongdoer's own act denies."), Dan Markel &
Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive justice, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 907, 911 (2010) (asserting that punishment is the "attempt to communicate to the offender
society's condemnation by means of a deprivation of an objective good"), and Dan Markel et al.,
Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive justice Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 612-13 (2011)
(conceptualizing punishment as "the communication of censure to the offender .. through
coercive deprivations" that are "objectively viewed and understood as undesirable").
2014] 105
IOWA LAWREVIEW
suffering and pain experienced by an offender at the hands of the state,
regardless of legislative intent, in determining whether a sanction constitutes
punishment? How do we decide what counts as "suffering" or "pain"? Should
we change the punishment given to a particular offender based on how she
experiences "pain" or "suffering" given her unique personal characteristics
and circumstances, or should it be one size fits all? These questions continue
to inspire debate. Courts usually defer to legislative intent to answer these
questions, whereas legal scholars approach the answers to these questions in
widely varying ways. Yet without some consensus as to what constitutes
punishment, it is impossible to assess whether restitution is being utilized
punitively.
This Article offers a new definition of punishment, one that
acknowledges the increasingly punitive nature of many previously "neutral"
criminal responses, of which restitution is but one.3s The definition around
which this discussion centers is a state action subsequent to a criminal
allegation, resulting in a substantial deprivation and/or obligation, and
imposed: (1) pursuant to a statute that reveals morally condemnatory intent;
(2) pursuant to a statute with unclear intent, but applied in a consistently
condemnatory manner; or (3) with the effect of substantially diminishing a
person's well-being as a result of the vengeance and moral condemnation
communicated by the state action. Relying on this definition, this Part will
explain why criminal restitution is punishment.
1. Deprivations and Obligations
Most conceptualizations of punishment start with deprivation,36 either of
something specific-some "good," such as liberty or money-or of certain
"rights," such as freedom of movement and earning ability. For example,John
Rawls asserted, "a person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally
35. Although this Article is grounded in one particular definition of punishment,
endorsement of this particular view of punishment is not essential to accepting the conclusion
that restitution is being utilized as punishment. Even under other prevailing definitions of
punishment, criminal restitution is punitive:Judges impose restitution in order to communicate
both condemnation of the offender's action and acknowledgement of the harm experienced by
the victim. See, e.g., Kahan, supranote 34, at 2483, Markel et al., supra note 34, at 612-13. Criminal
restitution is the "objectively determined, logical consequence of a crime imposed upon an
offender by the state." See, e.g., Gray, supra note 34, at 1664. Many people would experience a
court ordering them to pay money, especially money they never unlawfully gained and may never
have had, to another as a form of suffering, a subjectively distressing experience. See, e.g., Kolber,
The Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 34, at 1594, 16o6. Under most prevailing
conceptions of punishment, criminal restitution, as it has been applied in the past 30 years,
constitutes punishment.
36. See, e.g., Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, supra note 34, at 1585; see also
Andrew von Hirsch, Seriousness, Severity, and the Living Standard, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 185,
189 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1gg8); John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3,10 (1955).
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deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen."37 Andrew von Hirsch
conceptualized punishment as limiting a person's "freedom of movement,
earning ability, and so forth."38 J.D. Mabbott described punishment as
depriving from the recipient "something desired" or "something they would
like to retain."39 According to Mabbott, punishment is "deprivation of a
good . . . . Imprisonment and fine are deprivations of liberty and property.
The death sentence is deprivation of life ... ."40
Punishment, however, goes beyond tangible, corporeal deprivations. The
stigma associated with having a criminal conviction is a punishment that
usually lasts much longer than more palpable deprivations. Social scientists
studying the effects of criminal convictions and incarceration consistently find
that, for the average person, the "punishment" of a criminal conviction
extends far beyond the official, court-imposed sentence.4' Being branded a
"criminal" carries broad, indefinite, and quantifiable ramifications.4
Although judgment and commitment orders do not articulate this aspect of
punishment in their official documentation of a person's criminal sentence,
a person with a criminal conviction continues to be both legally and
practically "deprived of some of the normal rights of citizens"4s long after her
criminal sentence ends. Those additional, often life-long deprivations may
include tangible deprivations, such as continued disenfranchisement and the
removal of employment opportunities otherwise available.44 But they likely
also encompass more intangible deprivations, such as denial of friendships
and romantic relationships that otherwise might have been pursued but for
the others' view of the defendant's criminal conviction,45 diminishment of a
37. Rawls, supra note 36, at io.
38. von Hirsch, supra note 36, at 18g.
39. J.D. Mabbott, Professor lew on Punishment, 30 PHIL. 256, 257-58 (1955).
40. Id. at 257.
41. The same can also be said of the ramifications from being civilly committed as a result
of past behavior.
42. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. &
EcoN. 519 (1996); cf John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, supra note 34, at 1049-55
(discussing long-term effects of prison on well-being).
43. See Rawls, supra note 36, at so.
44. DEvAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 32-35 (2007); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 120-25
(2oo6); Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences ofIncarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQ 410,
412 (2001).
45. WESTERN, supra note 44, at 146-47; Beth M. Huebner, The Effect of Incarceration on
Marriage and Work over the Life Course, 22 JUST. Q. 281, 296 (2005); Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce
Western, Incarceration and the Formation and Stability of Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 721,
721 (2005);Jason Schnittker & AndreaJohn, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects ofIncarceration
on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 117 (2007); see also VICrOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF
HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 30 (201 1) ("[Punishment] destroys and
hinders the development of relationships between the offender and his family and friends, many
of whom will feel ashamed and distressed at the punishment of the offender.").
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person's mental and physical health because of the emotional and physical
toll of incarceration, and the stigma of having been identified and sanctioned
as a "criminal."46 For most, these life-long deprivations are every bit as real a
part of the punishment as the technical sentence imposed by a judge in a
criminal case.
Although these deprivations are rooted in the criminal conviction, they
likewise attach to every requirement imposed on a defendant as part of her
criminal sentence, including criminal restitution. A restitution debt imposed
as part of a criminal sentence is visibly marked as a criminal punishment by
its presence on a judge's Judgment and Commitment Order, and it, in turn,
continues to mark the person owing restitution as a "criminal." A criminal
restitution order can remain outstanding even after every other aspect of a
criminal sentence has been completed, and it alone can be the source of a
person's continued disenfranchisement or failure to obtain certain
employment opportunities. Criminal restitution is a continuing, weighty
consequence bearing down on the convicted defendant and depriving her of
"some of the normal rights of citizens."47
Undisputedly, then, deprivation is at the heart of punishment.
Punishment, however, can also involve obligations. Under the Law of
Obligations in the civil law system, an obligation is a "legal tie which binds [a
person] to the necessity of making some performance in accordance with the
laws of our state."48 In essence, an obligation is a personal duty created by an
individual's wrongdoing.49 Although the common law system has not adopted
a similar formal legal structure, obligations are present here, too. For
example, conditions of probation and supervised release imposed as a part of
a criminal defendant's sentence often require defendants to do certain things,
such as regularly meet with a probation or parole officer, participate in group
counseling, submit to scheduled and random drug testing, complete
community service, find and keep a job, among others.so Likewise, making
restitution payments is another legally created personal duty, imposed by a
46. Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious Disease, and Other Stress-
Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 56, 57 (2008); Michael Massoglia, Incarceration,
Health and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 L. & SOC'Y REV. 275, 296 (2oo8); Schnittker & John,
supra note 45, at 125. The decline in physical health begins once someone serves a period of
incarceration of 12 months, and continues beyond their release from prison. Massoglia,
Incarceration as Exposure, supra, 6o, 66-67.
47. See Rawls, supra note 36, at so.
48. Peter Birks, Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes 3.13, in THE CLASSIFICATION
OF OBLIGATIONS 1, 6 (Peter Birks ed., 1997) (citingJ. INST. 3.13).
49. Id. at 8.
50. In discussions about the ever-expanding reach of the carceral state, some scholars have
classified what this author terms legal "obligations" as "burdens" imposed by society on a person
recently released from jail, intended to "permanently exclude [them] from mainstream civil and
political society" and subject them to perpetual "state control ... achieved through probation,
parole or other forms of monitoring." Dolovich, supra note 6, at 283.
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judge at sentencing, and obligating a defendant to "perform," by coming up
with the income and making the required payments.
In fact, the civil law system has long considered restitution, in its original
guise, to be an obligation.3' When a person's wrongdoing leads to her unjust
enrichment, this unlawful gain creates the resulting monetary obligation of
restitution.52 As such, a party's unjust enrichment is a "right-generating"
event, a wrongdoing that entitles the wronged party to seek restitution.5s
Restitution under the Law of Obligations, however, is located in the
realm of private law, where the obligations arise between two private parties,
not in the public realm, where the obligation inures to the govemment.54
Modem criminal restitution relocates this obligation, this personal duty, in
the public realm of criminal law. A defendant's crime creates a restitution
obligation she owes to the crime victim, but the state, during a criminal
hearing, pursues payment and enforcement of this obligation, as part of the
punishment imposed for the defendant's wrongdoing. In other words, the
legal obligation-the victim compensation-the state seeks and the court
orders at a criminal sentencing bind the defendant to the state or federal
government. The displacement of this civil law obligation into the criminal
process transforms criminal restitution into something more than just an
obligation requiring the yield of unlawful gains to a different entity; rather,
criminal restitution becomes a binding obligation between the defendant and
the state intended to communicate moral condemnation, placing it squarely
under the auspices of punishment.
As a result, punishment can involve either a legally imposed deprivation
or a legally imposed obligation.
2. Presence in a Criminal Proceeding with Moral Judgment Attached
In every case of what this author considers punishment, the state at least
alleges that the person being punished has committed a criminal act. In some
cases, courts impose punishment directly in response to a conviction in a
criminal case, or the violation of a criminal court's order of probation or
supervised release. But in other cases, classified as civil, the allegation that
someone has broken a criminal law always lingers. The example of civil
commitment is fairly obvious: statutes authorizing the indefinite commitment
of someone deemed sexually dangerous come with prior allegations of
criminal conduct.55 Pretrial detention only comes about because someone has
51. Peter Birks, Misnomer, in RESTiTUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 1, 2-5 (W.R. Cornish
et al. eds., 1998).
52. Id.ati1,15.
53. See, e.g., William Swadling, What is the Law of Restitution About? Four Categorical Errors, in
RESTITUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 331, 331 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 1998).
54. Birks, supra note 51, at 9.
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.913 (West 2012) (authorizing petition for civil
commitment for a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense in Florida or
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been arrested for and accused of committing a crime. Deportation often
arises because someone has broken the law of entering the country without
legal authorization, a federal crime.56 And, of course, criminal restitution is
only imposed subsequent to some type of criminal conviction.57 Whether the
allegation of criminal activity results in a criminal conviction is not the critical
inquiry, nor is whether the allegation was recent or in the distant past. All that
is required is the allegation of criminal conduct-the stigma of moral
condemnation that, once attached, is almost impossible to shake off.
State action also remains a critical component of punishment. The role
of the state is linked to-but distinct from-whether the penalty is imposed
as part of a criminal proceeding. It is a basic tenet of criminal law that the
state or federal government is the party bringing the action in a criminal case,
and the offense for which one receives punishment is, at its core, an offense
against the general public, as opposed to an action between private parties.
Although crime victims are sometimes present and often represented by
counsel, 5 the government is still the only party to the case, other than the
defendant(s),59 and, procedurally, the prosecutor requests restitution. Thus,
another state); MINN. STAT. §§ 25 3 D.og, 60g.1351 (2013) (authorizing determination of
whether civil commitment appropriate for those convicted of sexual offenses at time of
sentencing hearing in criminal case or upon petition from commissioner of corrections); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 83-174.02 (2006) (requiring evaluation for civil commitment of individuals
convicted of committing certain sexual offenses); N.J. STAT. ANN, H@ 30:4-27.26, 30:4-82.4 (West
2014) (requiring evaluation for civil commitment of individuals convicted of committing, or
being found not guilty by reason of insanity, certain sexual offenses); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 841.003 (West 2013) (authorizing civil commitment for those who have committed
more than one sexually violent offense, as determined by a finding of guilt after trial or plea, or
a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity).
56. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012) (declaring any person who violates the Immigration
and Nationality Act deportable), with id. § 1325 (criminalizing unlawful entry to the United States
at a time or place other than those designated by immigration officers), and id. § 1326
(criminalizing unlawful re-entry to the United States after prior denial of admission, deportation,
exclusion or removal).
57. Although, criminal restitution is not always imposed for harms stemming from the
offense of conviction. See infra Part III.B.i.
58. Those victims who end up appealing are among those who have actually retained their
own counsel and therefore, are represented. Although it is probable that many crime victims are
not represented by counsel, the laws that are being created with the assistance of crime victims'
lawyers apply to and benefit all crime victims, represented or not.
59. Recently, attorneys for crime victims have been pushing courts to grant them standing
to intervene in criminal cases. See United States v. Fast, 7og F.3 d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 2013); In re
Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190, 195 (5 th Cir. 2011); United States v. Monzel, 641 F. 3 d 528, 540
(D.C. Cir. 2011). At least one circuit has found that, under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, victims
may appeal the adjudication of petitions for rehearing and motions for reconsideration. In re
Fisher, 649 F.3 d 401, 404-05 (5 th Cir. 201 1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (enumerating certain
rights crime victims possess). Another circuit has allowed victims to seek judgment liens based on
restitution orders. See United States v. Perry, 36o F. 3 d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664 (m)(i)(B)).
But, generally, victims still are not likely to be granted standing in criminal cases. See Marino
v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) ("The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
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courts impose restitution as part of a criminal sentence due to state action.
Punishment, including the imposition of criminal restitution, requires the
deprivations and obligations to have been imposed subsequent to a
defendant's criminal act and as the result of state action.
3. What Distinguishes Punishment from a Civil Remedy
Although state action is essential to criminal punishment, the presence
of state action does not inherently make a proceeding criminal. State action
resulting in legal deprivations and obligations also occurs in cases
undisputedly civil in nature. In fact, one might easily argue that restitution
imposed in a criminal sentencing hearing is still a civil proceeding simply
transported into a criminal case, thereby taking it out of the realm of
punishment and keeping it compensation. Judge Richard Posner, of the
Seventh Circuit, has expressed this opinion. "Functionally, the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act is a tort statute," he wrote in a 1999 case.So "The Act
enables the tort victim to recover his damages in a summary proceeding
ancillary to a criminal prosecution." 6' Thus there has to be something more
than a state-sanctioned deprivation or obligation for a remedy to constitute
punishment.
The scaffolding this Article utilizes to distinguish a civil sanction from
criminal punishment expands on the framework the Supreme Court laid out
in Hudson v. United States.62 In Hudson, the Court instructed lower courts to
inquire first as to whether the legislature "indicated either expressly or
impliedly a preference for one label [criminal or civil] or the other."3
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled."); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 619 (1973) ("The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing
to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor
threatened with prosecution."); United States v. Slovacek, 699 F.3 d 423, 427 (5 th Cir. 2012)
("The question of who may appeal remains governed by the principle that nonparties generally
lack the capacity to appeal."); United States v. Mindel, 8o F. 3 d 394, 397-98 (9 th Cir. 1996)
(finding that Congress did not intend to give victims a private right to sue or to appeal restitution
decisions); United States v.Johnson, 983 F.2d 216, 217 (lith Cir. 1993) (holding that crime
victims do not have standing to appeal a district court's recission of a criminal restitution order);
United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that victims are not party to
sentencing hearings). Precedent continues to be against permitting third parties to intervene in
criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France SA, 688 F. 3 d 1301, 1307 (1 1 th Cir.
2012) (holding that a third party company does not have standing to appeal court's order
denying victim status and restitution); United States v. Stoerr, 695 F.3 d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2012)
(holding that a third party, the defendant's employer, does not have standing to appeal after
voluntarily reimbursing victim for losses and being denied restitution from defendant on the
grounds that third party is not a crime victim); In re Fisher, 649 F. 3 d 401, 405 (5 th Cir. 2011)
(denying a developer status as a victim and standing to pursue direct appeal under Crime Victims'
Rights Act).
60. United States v. Bach, 172 F.3 d 520, 523 (7 th Cir. 1999).
61. Id.
62. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
63. Id. at 99 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
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According to the Court, "only the clearest proof' can override legislative
intent.64 In very rare instances, despite a legislative assertion of a penalty's civil
character, courts still may deem a sanction to be punishment after analyzing
the second prong: whether the statutory scheme is "so punitive either in
purpose or effect" as to transform it into a criminal penalty.65 To determine a
statute's punitive "purpose or effect," the Court provides seven guideposts
from a 1963 case, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
(i) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned.66
Surprisingly, only one circuit court has employed the Court's test in
considering whether criminal restitution falls on the criminal or civil side of
the ledger. 67
Although the Hudson-Mendoza-Martinez framework provides the starting
point for the discussion in the next Subpart, the approach this Article
advocates quickly diverges from the Supreme Court's. The Court's test gives
incredible deference to legislative intent, as the "clearest proof' to override
such intent indicates. As a result, after applying the Mendoza-Martinez test, the
Supreme Court has never found a civil sanction sufficiently punitive in
"purpose or effect" to be criminal punishment. The circuit courts have only
rarely made such a finding.68 Thus, the seven guideposts are a fairly ineffective
64. Id. at too (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
65. Id. at 99 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49).
66. Id. at 99-oo (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
67. United States v. Newman, 144 F. 3 d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). But see United States v.
Estate of Parsons, 367 F. 3 d 409, 424-25 (5 th Cir. 2004) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing the
Mendoza-Martinez test in support of finding criminal restitution under MVRA not punishment);
United States v. Edwards, 162 F-3 d 87, go n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting the Hudson test, but relying
on a different circuit-created test).
Likely this failure to apply the Hudson test is due to courts finding conclusive proof of the
VWPA and MVRA's intended purpose, allowing them to avoid reaching the seven factors. See
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 ("Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the
penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face.").
Yet the fact that different circuits have reached different conclusions as to the statutes' intent
suggests the inquiry is not so clear cut.
68. As of 1998, no circuit court had found a civil sanction sufficiently punitive in effect to
render it punishment. Cf Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of
Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1261, 1282 (1998) (describing how the Supreme Court, as of
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mechanism for challenging a legislature's determination of a statute's impact.
Not only does the Court's framework make the effects inquiry
inconsequential, it gives no consideration to how a statute might operate in
application. The legislature might not have intended a statute to be punitive,
but, as a separate question from the effects of a statute, if judges habitually
apply the sanction as punishment, the law should allow for some consideration
of that punitive application as well.
Rather than utilizing the guideposts laid out in Hudson-Mendoza-Martinez,
the inquiry below weighs each of three attributes-intent, application, and
effects-equally. Each of these attributes leads a remedy to be criminal
punishment when combined with the other factors already delineated: a state
action subsequent to a criminal allegation, resulting in a substantial
deprivation and/or obligation.
a. Legislative Intent
Sometimes, legislative intent determines whether a remedy is
punishment. In fact, as indicated, the Supreme Court has identified legislative
intent as the key to determining whether a particular remedy should be
considered punishment. The Court explained in Trop v. Dulles:
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally
based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the
statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment-that is,
to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been
considered penal. But a statute has been considered nonpenal if it
1998, "[had] yet to brand a nominally civil sanction as criminal pursuant to the Mendoza-Martinez
factors"). In a review of several hundred cases published since that time, this author found only
five instances where a circuit court concluded or even suggested that a statute is sufficiently
punitive in effect to deem it criminal rather than civil. Of the five, the Supreme Court vacated
two decisions, disagreeing with the results the circuit courts reached after applying Hudson, and
two other decisions relied in large part on Supreme Court case law pre-dating Hudson and
applicable only in the tax context. See Mont. Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 51 1 U.S. 767, 783
(1994) (finding a tax on seized illegal drugs to "depart[ ]so far from normal revenue laws as to
become a form of punishment"); see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F. 3 d 924, 941 (9 th
Cir. 2010) (determining that retroactive application of Montana's juvenile sex offender registry
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause after finding "clearest proof" that the statute was punitive
in effect), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011); Moyer v. Alameida, 184 F. App'x 633, 640 (gth Cir.
2oo6) (declining to ultimately decide the issue, the court found that imposition of a fee on
prisoners whose prison wages and trust account deposits are garnished to pay off restitution fines
might be punitive under the effects test); Dye v. Frank, 355 F-3 d 1102, 1107 (7 th Cir. 2004)
(relying partly on Kurth Ranch in finding drug tax so punitive in purpose and effect that it violated
DoubleJeopardy Clause); Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3 d 979, 993-95 (9 th Cir. 2001) (finding Alaska's
Sex Offender Registration Act punitive in effect and its application a violation of the Ex Post
Facto clause), reversed sub nom. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Lynn v. West, 134 F-3 d 582,




imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other
legitimate governmental purpose.69
Punitive intent can be helpful in determining whether a court-ordered,
state-sanctioned deprivation or obligation, such as restitution, amounts to
criminal punishment. Most of the time, if a legislature clearly articulates that
it intends a particular deprivation or obligation to be punitive in nature, there
is little question that the resulting sanction is punishment. The expression of
vengeance, condemnation, and moral blameworthiness in statutory language
is specific to the realm of criminal law and signals that punishment will be the
remedy for the action in question. Even when legislative history does not
contain explicit reference to "punishment" or "retribution," it is often clear
from the broader conversations leading to a statute's passage that a
deprivation or obligation is being considered in order to communicate a
strong message of vengeance, moral condemnation, and blameworthiness to
the person who has committed a particularly heinous and offensive action.
When coupled with the desire to impose some type of harm on a person to
"make them pay" for the act, or omission, they have committed, this moral
condemnation reveals an intent to punish the person found to have
committed such offenses.
Legislatures crafted modern criminal restitution statutes with a punitive,
as well as a compensatory, intent. In writing the law that first made restitution
a regular aspect of federal criminal proceedings,70 Congress made clear its
intent for restitution to be a compensatory mechanism that allowed a
defendant to "make personal recompense to his victim" while also being a
punitive mechanism requiring him to "pay his debt to society."7' Eight years
later, then-Senator Joseph Biden introduced a bill-that later became the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA")-which included language
mandating restitution for victims of sex-related and domestic violence
crimes.72 Reflecting on the dual purposes behind the inclusion of the criminal
restitution provision, he offered this summary, "[T] here are two parts to this
equation. One is get the bad guy and punish the bad guy. The second is take
the victim and try to restore them."7s Finally, with the passage of the MVRA in
1996, the Senate announced its aim "to ensure that the loss to crime victims
is recognized, and that they receive the restitution that they are due," as well
69. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, g6 (1958).
70. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(C) (2)).
71. B.S. Yamey, Reports of Committees: Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence, 24 MOD. L.
REv. 744,744 (1961).
72. Domestic Violence Is Target of Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 199o), http://www.nytimes.com/
1990/12/i6/us/domestic-violence-is-target-of-bill.htmI (discussing Senator Biden's proposed
Violence Against Women Act).
73. 140 CONG. REC. S121 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1994) (statement of Sen.Joseph Biden).
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as "to ensure that the offender realizes the damage caused by the offense and
pays the debt owed to the victim as well as to society."74
Thus, from a legislative-intent perspective, modern restitution statutes
reveal at least some morally condemnatory, punitive intent. The statutes aim
to "punish the bad guy" and "ensure that the offender realizes the damage
caused by the offense" through criminal restitution. Although Congress also
expressed compensatory goals, punishing the offender for her actions was an
essential aim of these statutes.
Yet the results of the legislative-intent inquiry are not always convincing,
especially in light of the deference given to legislative labeling. Take, for
example, the indefinite and involuntary commitment of individuals deemed
sexually violent after their criminal sentences are complete. The Supreme
Court has defined the commitment as a civil remedy, intended to protect the
public from the potential future dangerousness of a "sexually violent
predator." In making this determination, the Supreme Court looked to
legislative intent.75 According to the Court, the Kansas statute at issue in the
seminal case, Kansas v. Hendricks, is aimed at those "who are unable to control
their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and
safety."?6 Because (1) the commitment "does not implicate either of the two
primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deterrence;"
(2) the statute does not have a "scienter requirement" marking it as a criminal
statute;?? and (3) the state "disavowed any punitive intent,"?8 the Court
uncritically accepted the legislative labeling and concluded the state-sought
deprivation is civil in nature. Although the Court noted that the individual
must have "past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that
creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not
incapacitated,"79 the Court concluded the statute's intent in indefinitely
detaining someone classified as sexually dangerous is not punishment.so Many
would challenge this conclusion, but looking solely to what is on record as to
the legislative intent, the Court's finding seems inevitable. Thus, at times,
74. S. REP. No. 104-179, at 12 (1995). Most state statutes also were created with dual
purposes: compensation and punishment, sometimes with rehabilitation as an added goal. See,
e.g., Scott Peterson, Court-Ordered Criminal Restitution in Washington, 62 WASH. L. REV. 357, 359 &
n.15 (1987); see also OKL. ST. tit. 22, § 9 91f(A)(i) (2014) (authorizing criminal restitution to
"compensate [the] victim for up to three times the amount of the economic loss suffered as a
direct result of the criminal act of the defendant").
75. Professor Wayne Logan has challenged the Court's approach to answering the
"punishment" question in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), arguing it was inconsistent
with the Court's other Ex Post Facto jurisprudence, precedent that was markedly absent from the
Court's analysis. See Logan, supra note 68, at 1286-88.
76. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
77. Id. at 361-62.
78. Id. at 368--6g.
79. Id. at 357-58.
8o. Id. at 368-69.
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Courts rely on fairly unconvincing assertions of legislative intent to determine
whether a deprivation constitutes punishment or something else.
However, in the context of criminal restitution, legislative intent reveals
it is punishment, under the first prong of the definition: a state action
subsequent to a criminal allegation, resulting in a substantial deprivation
and/or obligation, and imposed pursuant to a statute that reveals morally
condemnatory intent.
b. Retributive Application
Even if a legislature does not affirmatively indicate its intent for a statute
to be punitive, this silence should not end the punishment inquiry.
Sometimes a statute with unclear intent still amounts to punishment when
courts apply it in a consistently condemnatory manner. For those who might
find the intent of the primary federal restitution statutes ambiguous, due to
the dual purposes expressed, evaluating criminal restitution under the second
approach might seem more appropriate. Despite what might be characterized
as conflicting intents, the consistent application of criminal restitution
statutes in a manner intended to communicate moral condemnation also
marks restitution as punishment.
As previously discussed, when criminal restitution is measured by a
victim's loss and expanded to compensate a broader range of harms,
including emotional, psychological and hedonic harms, it becomes much
more difficult to calculate the appropriate amount of restitution. The harms
are less tangible and often the connection to the defendant less clear. As a
result, instances reveal that courts calculate and impose restitution in a
vengeful, morally condemnatory way.S'
Assuming arguendo the legislature intended criminal restitution to be
primarily compensatory, it would seem to be axiomatic, even under an
approach that measures loss, not gain, that the judge imposing restitution
know with some specificity for what losses a particular defendant is
responsible, and therefore, what amount of money will reimburse the victim
for those losses. In a criminal system, a concrete, reliable method should be
required for determining the amount of harm a particular defendant caused,
so the defendant will know in advance what amount she will need to pay to
compensate the victim for the losses associated with that particular offense.8 2
81. See infra notes 83, 93 and accompanying text.
82. The recent proposal by Senators Orrin Hatch and Charles Schumer, although setting a
consistent amount of "restitution" owed, does not actually accomplish this aim. See Amy and Vicky
Child Pornography Victim Restitution Improvement Act of 2014, S. 2301, 113 th Cong. (2d. Sess.
2014), available at http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/oioa 5 7ei-b38f-4 85 a-gco 5 -
oa39fao 3 b6gc/Amy%2oand%2oVicky%2oAct%20-%2ocirculation%2odraft.pdf; 16o CONG. REC.
S2798-99 (daily ed. May 7, 2014). Under the Senators' proposal, defendants convicted of a child
pornography offense would be required to pay either the "full amount" of a victim's restitution, or
a minimum of $25,000 to each victim of child pornography. SeeS. 2301, § 3. Although the amount
would be the same in every case, there remains an absence of correlation between the harms caused
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Otherwise, judges would seem to be arbitrarily imposing restitution with no
correlation to the specific losses claimed or the particular defendant being
sentenced. Yet a closer look at how criminal restitution is being imposed in at
least one context reveals the lack of a concrete or consistent methodology for
calculating restitution, and the subtle opening that arbitrariness provides for
moral condemnation to slip in to criminal restitution decisions.
To date, the consistent application of criminal restitution statutes in a
morally condemnatory manner has occurred primarily in the context of child
pornography cases.83 In 2oo8, victims of child pornography began to seek
restitution from individuals convicted of viewing and trading their images.
The defendants were not individuals with whom the victims ever had contact,
and most of the time, the victims were not specifically aware that these
offenders had viewed their images until the court system notified them. But
because restitution is now being measured by a victim's loss rather than the
defendant's gain, courts began granting child pornography victims'
restitution requests for losses with an attenuated nexus to the defendant's
conduct.
According to the restitution claims submitted, victims suffer new harm
due to the continued circulation of their image on the Internet, and
therefore, they seek restitution from all individuals who view the pornography
in which they are depicted. The most prominent child pornography victim to
seek compensation has sought upward of $3 million from hundreds of
defendants convicted of possessing or receiving images of her. This $3 million
amount consists of future lost wages to the age of 65 (she is in her early 20S
now), mental health treatment to the age of 81, expert witness fees, and
attorneys' fees. A second victim has sought a little over $1 million per case, to
cover tuition payments, lost income for delayed entry into the work force,
rehabilitation counseling for education and career planning, future lost
earnings, future psychological counseling, and attorneys' fees.84 Several other
child pornography victims have begun to seek restitution as well.
by a particular defendant and the amount this bill would require the defendant to pay. In essence,
this bill simply allows for the imposition of a version of a pre-set, hefty criminal fine, paid to the
victim rather than the government See Cheryl Wetzstein, Bill Would Address Supree Court Ruling on
Porn Victims, WASH. TIMEs (May 7, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 4 /may/7/
bill-would-address-supreme-court-ruling-porn-victi.
83. Other examples have begun to arise, especially in the securities fraud context. See, e.g.,
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 8-9, Gushlak v. United States, No. 13-939 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2014)
(noting district court ordered $17.5 million restitution to multimillionaire based on government
regression model that, his lawyers argue, failed to take causative factors into account); Mitchel
Maddux, Con's 'Poor'Excuse, N.Y. POST (Mar. 5, 2012, 5:oo AM), http://nypost.com/2012/O3/
05/cons-poor-excuse (discussing "disgraced" "con man" Myron Gushlak who "blew millions of
dollars" and "stuck it to his victims one last time").
84. Brief ofAppellant app. 2 at 143-44, United States v. Crawford, 2011 WL 6018 3 74 (6th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (No. 11-5544)-
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In an approach now endorsed by the Supreme Court,85 numerous judges
in state and federal courts across the country have granted these restitution
requests, using a range of approaches to determine the quantity of a victim's
losses attributable to a particular defendant.8 6 To determine the amount of a
victim's loss, judges have engaged in a significant amount of "fudgi[ing]," in
the words of one government lawyer.87 Most judges who have awarded
restitution in possession and distribution of child pornography cases have
authorized amounts ranging from $iooo to $6ooo-usually based on less-
than-precise judicial calculations as to the intangible emotional harm a
particular defendant has caused, and will cause, by his possession or
distribution of the images, whether the victim knew this defendant possessed
her image or not.88
Weighing in on this approach, the Supreme Court embraced the
looseness in how lower courts determine restitution, declining to require trial
judges to determine with any specificity the amount of restitution owed.
Neither the criminal restitution statute nor any court has come up with an
endorsable method of quantifying the amount of harm attributable to any
given defendant. Some of the approaches adopted include determining the
amount of restitution based on the number of images found, the number of
defendants arrested (a number that continues to change), or whether the
85. United States v. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1728 (2014) ("There are a variety of factors
district courts might consider in determining a proper amount of restitution, and it is neither
necessary nor appropriate to prescribe a precise algorithm for determining the proper restitution
amount at this point in the law's development.... [D]istrict courts might, as a starting point,
determine the amount of the victim's losses ... then set an award of restitution in consideration
of factors that bear on the relative causal significance of the defendant's conduct in producing
those losses. These could include the number of past criminal defendants found to have
contributed to the victim's general losses; reasonable predictions of the number of future
offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to the victim's general losses;
any available and reasonably reliable estimate of the broader number of offenders involved. ...
These factors need not be converted into a rigid formula ... [but] should rather serve as rough
guideposts for determining an amount that fits the offense.").
86. At least three district court judges simply ordered restitution in the full $3 million-plus
amount requested by one victim, without attempting to parse out for what portion of harm or losses
the particular defendant in that case might be responsible. United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218,
1270-71 (1 ith Cir. 2012) (vacating districtjudge's restitution order of $3,263,7 5 8); United States
v. Staples, No. 09 -14 017-CR, 2009 WL 282720 4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (ordering defendant to
pay restitution in full $3,68o,153 amount); seealsoMark Reagan, Hedrick'sSentence:3o Years in Prison,
BROWNSVILLE HERALD (Dec. 20, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/news/
local/article_63e7ea3a-4a5c- ie2-83700Ola 4 bcf6878.html (discussing Southern District of
Texas's imposition of $3,388,417 order in Amy's favor in the case of United States v. Hedrick).
However, the Supreme Court rejected this "all or nothing" approach in its recent Paroline decision.
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1721, 1726, 1727.
87. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1728 (No. 12-8561)
(describing how one court employed a "fudge factor" in calculating restitution).
88. Tim McGlone, Victim of Child Porn Wants Viewers to Pay, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 25, 2009,
at A6; see also Lollar, supra note 17, at 365; infra Part III.B.2.
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defendant has sold or otherwise distributed the images.89 Courts are
emboldened to guess at the amount of harm caused by a defendant's action,
and order an amount of money that they deem appropriate. As a result of this
ad hoc approach, the amount of criminal restitution courts impose is, in many
cases, only tangentially related to specific, articulable losses the victims of
crime claim. Certainly the assertion that courts are measuring restitution by
"actual losses" is questionable at best. The harms are intangible and the
number of potential viewers incredibly difficult to pin down.9o
Beyond just being a sloppy approach, closer inspection of judicial
opinions reveals courts have ordered viewers and traders of child
pornography to pay restitution in order to punish them for the illicit pleasure
they received at the expense of victims of child sexual abuse. As the Court
noted in Paroline, "one reason to make restitution mandatory for crimes like
this is to impress upon offenders that their conduct produces concrete and
devastating harms for real, identifiable victims."9' Restitution punishes the
defendant for the fact that child pornography continues to circulate against
the victim's wishes, and on some level, for the fact that as a society, we want to
89. The difficulty in ascertaining how to best resolve this question was apparent during the
oral argument before the Supreme Court in Paroline, Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, 45,
Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 12-8561), as well as in the Court's opinion, Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at
1728, 1729. A victim's lawyer was arguing that every defendant should be required to pay the
entire full amount of losses requested by the victim. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, 45,
Paroline, 13 4 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 12-8561). Defense counsel argued that there was insufficient ability
to ascertain the linkage between his client's conduct and the precise harm to the victim to order
any restitution. Id. at 5. And the government, repeatedly pressed by the Court to give a workable
formula for calculating criminal restitution in these cases, could only say it should be somewhere
in between. Id. at 22-27, 29-30, 32-33.
Subsequent to the Court's recent decision in Paroline, most federal district courts have adopted
an approach previously endorsed by several judges and prosecutors around the country. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hagerman, No. 5 :Io-CR-o4 62 (GTS), 2011 WL 6096505, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Nov.
30, 201 1) (calculating that "approximately 146 defendants, including this Defendant, have been
successfully prosecuted for unlawfully possessing or receiving the 'Vicky' series," and determining
the defendant's restitution amount by dividing the total amount the victim requested by 146).
This approach takes the number of defendants currently convicted of having possessed
pornographic images featuring the victim and divides the amount the victim has requested by
that number. See United States v. Galan, No. 6:1 i-CR-6oi 4 8 (AA), 2014 WL 3474901, at *6-7
(D. Or. July 11, 2014); United States v. Hernandez, No. 2:1 1-CR-ooo26 (GEB), 2014 WL
2987665, at *8 (E.D. Ca.Jul. 1, 2014). In an effort to take into consideration the untold number
of individuals who have viewed, possessed or distributed a victim's image but not yet been arrested
or prosecuted, at least one judge has made the assumption that the number of people "caught,
convicted, and ordered to contribute to the payment of her damages" could double, and has
divided the requested restitution amount by that higher number. See United States v. Cirsostomi,
No. 12-166-M, 2014 WL 3510215, at*3 (D.R.I.July 16, 2014).
go. According to the most prominent child pornography victim's attorney, at least 70,000
people have seen her image. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Paroline, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (No.
12-8561).
g1. Paroline, 13 4 S. Ct. at 1727.
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hold someone accountable for the awful abuse the victim experienced.92 In
other words, in the context of child pornography cases, restitution has
become intertwined with retribution and moral vindication.
The application of criminal restitution statutes in child pornography
cases illustrates how, even with a statute aimed either partially or wholly at
compensation, the current method of measuring restitution leaves room for
restitution to be consistently applied in a manner expressing moral
condemnation. Restitution comes to achieve primarily retribution and
punishment, perhaps in addition to reimbursement. Increasingly, federal and
state restitution statutes are being applied in this retributive manner outside
the child pornography context as well.93 In light of the direction in which
restitution is going, and the Court's recent confirmation of criminal
restitution's punitive intent, it is likely that using restitution to express moral
condemnation will become more and more common.
c. Punitive Effects
Finally, a statute that does not manifest punitive intent on its face or in
application can still consistently result in effects that ultimately transform the
statute into a mechanism for punishment. If a statutory remedy imposes a
significant deprivation or obligation, pursuant to a criminal proceeding, and
results in a significant diminution of a person's well-being, whether the
legislature intends a statute to result in punishment seems a secondary
consideration. To return to the example of civil commitment, it would seem
incontrovertible to most that the indefinite detention of someone who has
committed sexually violent acts in the past-and might do so again in the
future-is sufficiently punitive in effect as to negate Congress' purported
intent to deem it civil.94 Despite the Court's finding to the contrary, a person
who is held against their will in a locked facility for an indefinite period of
time at the state's request, in large part for crimes previously committed,
undoubtedly has his well-being diminished in a way most people associate with
punishment.
As previously indicated, even the Supreme Court has recognized that
intent is not always enough; courts also must consider the effects of a
sanction.95 At times, the punitive effects of a law leave no doubt that an
92. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 44-45, Paroline, 13 4 S. Ct. 1710 (No. 12-
8561) (discussing difficulties of how to calculate restitution in the face of the "terrible crime" of
"viewing [a child's] rape").
93. See infra Part III.B.2.
94. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-68 (1997) (discussing the State's intent and
purpose of the Sexually Violent Predator Act); see also United States v. Salerno, 48 1 U.S. 739, 746
(1987) ("[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that the government has imposed punishment.").
95. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. For a more extended discussion of why the intent analysis
should be limited and the inquiry should focus on effects instead, see Chiao, supra note 34.
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offender is being punished for violating it, despite a legislature's clear intent
otherwise.96 Thus the Court allows the effect of a statute to trump legislative
intent if the petitioner can show that the statutory scheme is "so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [Congress'] intention to deem it
'civil.'"97 Although the Court has interpreted the effects inquiry very narrowly,
the acknowledgment that effects can play a role is important.
The effects inquiry is especially important in the context of restitution,
given restitution's presence in both civil and criminal proceedings. Some
judges continue to reject both the notion that the statutory language reveals
any punitive intent, as well as the evidence that criminal restitution statutes
are now consistently applied in a punitive manner. In fact, two circuit courts,
the Seventh Circuit and the Tenth Circuit, claim that restitution has no
punitive function. These two circuits have unequivocally and repeatedly
denounced any punitive purpose for criminal restitution.98 The Seventh
Circuit, led on this particular subject by Judge Richard Posner, readily admits
that it conceptualizes criminal restitution as a "classic civil remedy,"99
"administered for convenience by courts that have entered criminal
convictions."' The Tenth Circuit likewise has acknowledged a view of
restitution as a civil remedy imported into the criminal proceeding.oI
However, despite the misgivings of a few circuit courts, the Supreme
Court has continued to recognize that criminal restitution serves a different
96. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 275 (1996) (drawing distinction between
civil in rem forfeitures, which do not constitute punishment, and in personam civil penalties, which
may be considered punishment); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) (holding a civil
action to recover taxes is punitive and barred by a prior conviction of the defendant for a criminal
offense involving the same transactions).
97. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).
g8. United States v. Newman, 144 F-3 d 531, 538-42 (7th Cir. 1998). But see United States
v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 79o, 800-02 (7 th Cir. 1985). AlthoughJudge Posner embraces restitution
as a punitive remedy in Fountain, 14 years later, in United States v. Bach, his position had evolved
and he declared restitution "is not penal." United States v. Bach, 172 F. 3 d 520, 523 (7 th Cir.
1999); see also United States v. Speakman, 594 F-3 d ss65, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3 d 1300, 1316 (1 oth Cir. 2005); United States v. Nichols, 169 F. 3 d 1255,
1278-80 (1oth Cir. 1999).
99. United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3 d 1049, 1054 (7 th Cir. 2000); see also United States v.
Szarwark, 168 F. 3 d 993, gg8 (7 th Cir. 1999). But see Fountain, 768 F.2d at 800-02 (calling
restitution a criminal remedy aimed at "forcing the criminal to yield up to his victim the fruits of
the crime").
oo. United States v. George, 403 F-3 d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Bach, 172 F. 3 d at
523 (calling the imposition of restitution in criminal cases a "procedural innovation, a welcome
streamlining of the cumbersome processes of our law").
los. United States v. Wilfong, 551 F-3 d 1182, 1186-87 (loth Cir. 2008).
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aim than civil restitution.102 The Court recently reaffirmed criminal
restitution's "penological purposes"103:
[W]hile restitution . . . is paid to a victim, it is imposed by the
Government 'at the culmination of a criminal proceeding and
requires conviction of an underlying' crime. Thus, despite the
differences between restitution and a traditional fine, restitution still
implicates 'the prosecutorial powers of government.' The primary
goal of restitution is remedial or compensatory, but it also serves
punitive purposes. 0 4
In other words, the state-ordered deprivation or obligation of a monetary
payment based on the commission of a crime is punishment, especially to
those who are returned to jail or prison, or prevented from voting or running
for office solely based on the failure to pay it. In fact, the consequences of
failing to comply with a criminal restitution order are no different from those
that attach to any other traditionally recognized form of criminal
punishment.os
As such, in determining whether a sanction is punishment, courts should
take the retributive application and "effects" of a sanction into consideration.
Although the Court takes a relatively narrow approach in looking at the
punitive effects of a law, the application and effects of a statute should be
given equal weight to its intent in determining whether a state-requested
deprivation or obligation subsequent to a criminal proceeding is punishment.
Otherwise, legislatures can always assert that a law is regulatory, rather than
punitive, and thereby circumvent the protections afforded to criminal laws by
the Constitution and statutes.,o6 Stated legislative intent should never be the
dispositive inquiry.
Ultimately, a reduction in well-being that can be traced to a state-ordered
deprivation or obligation, imposed subsequent to a criminal proceeding in a
manner that consistently has the effect of limiting some basic enjoyment of
life, should be considered punishment.
III. CRIMINAL RESTITUTION AS PUNISHMENT
With this definition of punishment establishing the parameters, we
return to why restitution, as courts impose it in the criminal context,
102. Paroline, v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724; see also Pasquantino v. United States,
544 U.S. 349, 365 (2004) ("The purpose of awarding restitution ... is .. . to mete out appropriate
criminal punishment for that conduct."); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n. o, 51-53 (1986)
(describing restitution as a punishment, not compensation).
103. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1726.
104. Id. at 1726 (citations omitted).
105. See infra Part III.A.
io6. Cf Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 576 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing constitutional limits that exist irrespective of legislative definitions of crime).
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constitutes punishment, thereby implicating the constitutional protections
courts are reluctant to invoke. As previously discussed, criminal restitution is
imposed pursuant to a state action; is subsequent to a criminal allegation;
results in a substantial deprivation and/or obligation; and is imposed
(1) pursuant to a statute-both the VAWA and the MVRA-that reveals
retributive intent;07 (2) in a consistently retributive manner; or (3) the effect
is to substantially diminish the defendant's well-being, in a way consistent with
other criminal punishments. Applying this definition, this Part examines how
criminal restitution amounts to punishment on the ground. Part III
specifically looks at effects and application, the second and third prongs
discussed in the previous Part, and how they manifest in day-to-day
application.
A. THE PuNvE EFFECTS OF FAILING TO PAYREST7TUTION
The most obvious illustration of how restitution is treated as a criminal
punishment, and why criminal defendants ordered to pay restitution should
receive constitutional protection, is found in the consequences of failing to
pay it. The practical effects of failing to pay restitution are no different from
the effects of failing to pay a criminal fine, an unmistakable method of
punishment.os Failure to pay restitution results in a defendant's continued
disenfranchisement, suspension of her driver's license, continued court
supervision, and constant threat of re-incarceration.og Each of these is a
consequence that typically results from a criminal conviction. The effects are
no different with criminal restitution, again revealing the punitive nature of
its current usage.
Restitution is treated as punishment when it comes to the most basic
limitations that accompany a criminal sentence. Just as with any other
criminal punishment, many states decline to allow offenders who have not
paid their restitution to register to vote, participate on a jury, or run for
office-based on a finding that a failure to pay equates to a failure to complete
107. See supra Parts IIA, II.B. 3 .a; see also supra notes 24-25.
1o8. To the extent there was any doubt about this, Southern Union Co. v. United States clarified
those doubts, finding that a criminal fine is punishment. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2344, 2349-50 (2012). The distinction between restitution and criminal fines comes down to
the recipient: fines go to the state/government/court system, and restitution goes to crime
victims.
log. Additionally, many states do not permit a convicted defendant to seek to seal or expunge
her criminal record unless restitution has been paid. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-
308.9(2) (a) (V) (2013); IND. CODE § 35-38-9-8(b) (i1) (West 2014); IOWA CODE § 907.9(4) (b)
(201 4 ); Mo. ANN. STAT. §610.140(5) (3) (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-14 5 .5 (c) (2013);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 991c(C) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105(3) (b) (LexisNexis 2013);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7 602(b)(i)(C) (2012). Waiting periods for expungement or record
sealing often do not begin to run until a person has paid their restitution in full. For example, in
Wyoming, a person cannot petition for expungement of their record unless at least ten years have
passed since restitution was paid in full. SeeWYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-1502(a) (i) (C) (West 2011).
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the criminal sentence."0 Likewise, courts have authority to revoke probation
or supervised release and impose a prison sentence if the offender "willfully"
refuses to pay restitution or fails to make "sufficient bona fide efforts legally
to acquire the resources" to pay off the fine.' Although the inclusion of the
"willfulness" requirement has been imposed ostensibly to prevent the
reinstitution of debtors' prisons,' convicted defendants regularly have their
probation or supervised release revoked, and their re-enfranchisement rights
declined, due to their failure to pay a criminal fine or restitution."s
The failure to pay restitution also can result in significant, long-term
consequences, as it does with other criminal punishments. In order to pay
restitution, and successfully complete a criminal justice sentence, a
probationer or person on supervised release needs income. Unsurprisingly,
many individuals with criminal convictions have difficulty finding
employment upon the termination of their incarceration.14 It is not
uncommon for criminal defendants to lose the jobs they have subsequent to
their conviction and sentencing, even if they do not receive a sentence ofjail
time." 5 Although "maintaining" or "finding" employment is a condition of
almost every sentence, meeting this requirement is one of the most difficult
for most convicted defendants." 6 The burden is especially significant for
those who have monetary obligations, such as restitution, as part of their
110. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F-3 d 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2010); cf Harvey v. Brewer,
605 F-3 d 1o67, 1079-80 (9 th Cir. 2010).
111. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 66o, 672 (1983); see also United States v. Montgomery,
532 F.3 d 811, 813 (8th Cir. 2oo8); United States v. Reid, No. 07-14236, 2oo8 WL 1914337, at
*1 (1 ith Cir. 2008).
112. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667-68; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
113. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Get Out ofjail-But Not Free: Courts Scramble to Fill Their Coffers by
BillingEx-Cons, A.B.A.J. (July 1, 2012,9:5o AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
get out.of jailbut.-not free courtsscrambletofill their coffers.bybillin/.
114. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1 103, 1107
(2013) ("A criminal conviction often serves as a de facto informal basis forjob denial.").
1 15. R. Boshier & Derek Johnson, Does Conviction Affect Employment Opportunities?, 14 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 264 (1974); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 1 o8 AM.J. Soc. 937, 942-43,
955-57, 959 (2003); Richard Schwartz & Jerome Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, io Soc.
PROBS. 133 (1962); Bruce Western, The Impact ofIncarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM.
Soc. REv. 526, 528 (2002) (noting men in trusted or high-income positions prior to conviction
experience large earnings losses after release from prison, and that felony conviction can disqualify
someone from employment in certain fields).
116. See, e.g., Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in
the Contemporary United States, 115 AM.J. SOC. 1753, 1778, 1780-81 (2010) (noting that of those
with felony convictions surveyed, 48% were employed at the time of the interview and 6o% were
under community supervision); Kent R. Kerley et al., Race, Criminaljustice Contact, and Adult
Position in the Social Stratification System, 51 SOC. PROBS. 549, 550-53, 559 (2004); Lorelei Laird,
Doing Time Extended, A.B.A. J., June 2013, at 50, 53; Pager, supra note 115, at 955-57, gg-6o;
Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men
with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195 (2009); Joel Waldfogel, The
Effect of Criminal Conviction on Income and the Trust "Reposed in the Workmen, 29J. HUM. RESOURCES
62 (1994); Western, supra note 1 15, at 536, 538.
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criminal sentence. As a result, paying off a restitution obligation, which often
is all that remains for a convicted defendant to have completed her sentence,
becomes an insurmountable hurdle.
Finding employers who will hire an individual with a criminal conviction
and outstanding restitution obligation is challenging enough, especially with
the new mandatory eVerify requirements Congress imposed on businesses-
but it is not the only barrier to income for those seeking to pay off their
restitution obligation. Although statistics confirm the vast majority of criminal
defendants are indigent,,7 not much thought appears to go into how this lack
of financial stability translates for someone post-conviction. For example, in
order to work, one needs a way to get to work. Transportation is often a
problem. Many offenders do not have cars and live in areas outside cities that
do not have easy or reliable access to public transportation. Often the
communities that offer cheaper rent come at the price of convenience.
Additionally, available jobs are not always accessible by public transportation,
even if one lives near a bus or train stop. The results can be: difficulty
pounding the pavement to make connections and submit applications to a
manager, difficulty getting to interviews forjobs located in other parts of town
with openings posted online or in the newspaper, and difficulty getting to
work every day in the event one is offered a job in a location not walking
distance from home.
An additional complication for those with restitution obligations results
from the reality that employers increasingly use credit reports in their hiring
decisions." Financial information tends to stay on a credit report for seven
years."9 Restitution obligations show up on a credit report, and any difficulties
in keeping up with such payments can add another hurdle in securing
employment, while also setting up the potential for disqualification from food
stamps, low-income housing, housing assistance, federal Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") funds, and other benefits.120
Finding and keeping ajob is only part of the battle for most individuals
serving a term of probation, parole or supervised release and trying to pay
their restitution. Even with a job, many have trouble paying to keep a roof
over their heads and food to eat, much less paying court costs-fees, fines,
and restitution. Recent statistics show that the bottom 20% of the American
workforce-some 28 million workers-earn less than $9.89 an hour, or
117. See CAROLINE WOLFE HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
118. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 27 (201o), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/Fees%2oand%2oFines%2oFINAL.pdf; Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS
L.J. 57, 85 (2013).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2012); Plunkett, supra note 118, at 85.
120. BANNONET AL., supra note 1 18, at 28.
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approximately $20,570 a year.' 2 ' Many of those individuals rely on food
stamps, housing assistance, and Medicaid in order to meet their basic
needs..22 Given the indigence statistics for criminal defendants prior to
conviction, and the dim employment prospects afterward, the majority of
employed individuals on probation, parole, and supervised release likely fall
into this low-wage earning group.123 In other words, even individuals under
court supervision who manage to find employment may not be able to both
sustain themselves and meet their court-ordered financial obligations.
Because of a change to the federal statute back in the mid-199os, judges
are no longer permitted to consider a convicted defendant's ability to pay
when they impose restitution.'14 Whatever the court determines is the "full
121. Steven Greenhouse, Fighting Back Against Wretched Wages, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2ol3/07/28/sunday-review/fighting-back-against-wretched-wages.html
(citing study by Economic Policy Institute).
122. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, Washington Push for Higher Minimum Wage for Workers Has Walmart
Balking, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/O7/21/us/washington-
push-on-wages-has-walmart-balking.html (discussing government subsidization of Walmart
employees with food stamps, housing assistance, and Medicaid due to low wages); Greenhouse,
supra note 121 (profiling ten-year veteran employee of McDonald's who subsidizes her income
with food stamps and Medicaid in order to support herself and her family).
123. A majority of individuals sentenced on felony and misdemeanor charges receive
monetary sanctions, with those defendants who receive probationary sentences more likely to
receive such penalties at sentencing. Harris et al., supra note 1 16, at 1770-71, 1786. On average,
formerly incarcerated white, Hispanic, and black men owe approximately ioo%, 69% and 222 %
of their annual incomes to legal debt. Id. at 1776. "Felons who consistently pay $50 a month will
still possess legal debt after 30 years of regular monthly payment." Id. Unfortunately, only a small
percentage of federal and state parole and probation agencies report employment data, and
those agencies that do report the data reveal a widely varying range of employment statistics. See
John Rakis, Improving the Rates of Ex-Prisoners on Parole, 69 FED. PROBATION I, http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2005-o6/employment.html (last visited Oct.
1, 2014).
124. See Lollar, supra note 17, at 357. Prior to 1992, and the creation of a mandatory
restitution requirement through VAWA,judges were able to take a defendant's ability to pay into
consideration before determining how much restitution to order, and both offender compliance
and victim satisfaction with restitution were higher than they are now. The requirement that
restitution be mandatory and ordered in "the full amount" has had a negative impact across the
board. The amount of restitution ordered regularly exceeds the defendant's financial
capabilities, leaving many defendants with no ability to pay and "no reasonable prospect of
paying." People v. Kay, 1i Cal. Rptr. 894, 896 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Dickman, supra note 5, at
1704-05.
In fact, restitution collection rates have dropped precipitously since restitution became
mandatory. Prior to VAWA, debt collection rates from defendants ordered to pay restitution
ranged from 13.3% to 34% and 54%. The 13.3% figure is the rate of collection in the federal
system for fiscal year 1992, based on the collection amount divided by the total debt owed. U.S.
ATTORNEYS' STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 1992 tbl. 12 (1992), available at http://www.
justice.gov/usao/reading-room/reports/iggos/STATISTICALREPORTFISCALYEAR_1 i9g
2.pdf. The 34-54% figure comes from state restitution programs, many of which consider an
offender's ability to pay before ordering restitution. See Dickman, supra note 5, at 1694 n.53.
Unsurprisingly, the rate of debt collection has dropped to a collection rate of 5% of restitution
owed to non-government victims as of fiscal year 2011. U.S. ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL
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amount" of restitution, the defendant must pay, even if she has no income or
ability to pay, and it takes her the remainder of her life to do sO.1 2 5 Rarely will
courts agree to terminate a criminal sentence when a restitution obligation
remains outstanding. Thus, even when someone is employed and slowly
paying down the restitution, her civil rights will remain curtailed until she has
made the final payment, which is the same as with any other criminal financial
obligation.i26 A review of state laws reveals that, in most instances, unpaid
criminal restitution means a convicted defendant cannot vote, serve on ajury,
run for public office, or possess a firearm.127
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011 tbl. 8 (201 1), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_
room/reports/asr2o1 I/ i statrpt.pdf (derived by dividing restitution payments received by total
amount owed to third parties in restitution). The Department of Justice has repeatedly
acknowledged that the reason for this decline is "the lack of relationship between the amount
ordered and its corresponding collectability," attributable to VAWA and the MVRA's requirement
thatjudges not consider the financial means of the offender when imposing restitution. Dickman,
supra note 5, at 1694 (citing Letter from Mary Beth Buchanan, Dir. of Exec. Office for U.S.
Attorneys, to Gary T. Engel, Dir. of Fin. Mgmt. & Assurance, in U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY
COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMs IN SELECTED FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 20-22 (2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/2 4 5 227.pdf. The result of so much unpaid
restitution is that many victims end up feeling more disempowered and disillusioned with the
criminal justice system than they would if they were given a realistic sense of how restitution works
in practice. See R. BARRY RUBACKET AL., CRIME, LAW, &JUSTICE PROGRAM, PENN STATE UNIVERSIlY,
EVALUATION OF BEST PRACTICES IN RESTITUTION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION ORDERS AND
PAYMENTS 123 (2006); Robert C. Davis et al., Restitution: The Victim's Viewpoint, 15JUST. SYS.J. 746,
751-54 (1992).
Since the passage of MVRA, the outstanding federal criminal debt, which consists of unpaid fines,
federal restitution, and non-federal restitution-restitution owed to victims of crime other than the
federal government, but for which the government maintains collection responsibility-has grown
from $6 billion to more than $64 billion, as of 2010. Criminal Restitution Improvement Act of 2oo6:
Hearing on H.R 5673 Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on
the judiciary, logth Cong. i (2oo6) (statement of Rep. Coble, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-o 4 -3 88, CRIMINAL DEBT:
AcnONS STILL NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES INJUSTICE'S COLLECTION PROCESSES 1, 7 (2004);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-o1-664, CRIMINAL DEBT: OVERSIGHT AND ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN COLLECTION PROCESSES 8 (2001); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS'
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010 tbl. 8c (2010), available at http://www.justice.
gov/usao/readingroom/reports/asr2o0o/sostatrpt.pdf (reporting $64,450,675,679.11 in
outstanding criminal debt at the end of fiscal year 2olo); Dickman, supra note 5, at 1692. Of that
$64 billion in unpaid restitution and fines, close to $51.5 billion, or approximately 8o%, is from
unpaid restitution to non-government victims. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra, at tbl. 8b (reporting a
principal balance of $51,554,408,626.74 in non-federal restitution at the end of fiscal year 2010);
see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-o 4 -3 88, supra, at 2-3 (revealing that, as of 2002,
non-federal restitution accounted for 70% of federal criminal debt).
125. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986) (holding criminal restitution imposed by
state courts cannot be discharged in bankruptcy proceedings).
126. Obligations to continue paying restitution even after the completion of all other aspects of a
criminal sentence, including probation, parole or supervised release, can remain. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Bredesen, 624 F.3 d 742 (6th Cir. 2010); State v. Zaputil, 207 P.3 d 678 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
127. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-912 (2004) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4 0-29-202 (b) (i)
(2013) (conditioning eligibility to vote on having paid restitution obligation); WASH. CODE ANN.
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In addition to the civil collateral consequences that come with a failure
to pay off one's criminal restitution debt, other criminal-punitive
consequences also continue to linger as a result of the difficulties many
convicted defendants have in making those payments. In the instances when
a convicted defendant is not making notable payments toward the restitution
balance, further incarceration continues to lurk. Although courts are not
permitted to revoke someone's probation or supervised release just for a
failure to pay a criminal fine, fees, or restitution, ample evidence from across
the country documents that courts do just that on a regular basis.1IS At the
very least, most courts employ a very loose interpretation of the "willfulness"
requirement.'29 Despite the prohibition on incarcerating someone for being
poor, a reinstitution of the forbidden debtors' prisons, in practice, many
judges are not sympathetic to a convicted defendant's failure to find a job,
and it is rare for ajudge to not find a defendant's failure to pay "willful.",so
The result is that many individuals on court supervision end up back in jail or
prison for failing to meet their restitution obligations. 13
What may appear to the court as someone dragging their feet and not
making an effort to seek or maintain employment is often the result of the
overwhelming logistical challenges that must be overcome to even get one's
§ 29 A.08.2 5 0 (West 2013) (conditioning right to vote on completing restitution obligations); see
also Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F-3 d 1067, 1080-81 (9 th Cir. 2010) (finding constitutional Arizona
law that prohibits convicted defendant from having voting rights restored while still owing
restitution obligation).
128. See OmFCE OF JUDICIAL SERVS., SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, COLLECTION OF FINES AND
COURT COSTS IN ADULT TRIAL COURTS (2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
Publications/JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf; Harris et al., supra note 116, at 1761 ("[W]arrants may
be issued, and arrests and confinement may occur, solely due to nonpayment of legal debt.");
Editorial, Return ofDebtors'Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
07/14/opinion/return-of-debtors-prisons.html; Ohio High Court Offers Judges Fines, Fees Guidance,
OHIo.CoM (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:16 AM), http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/ohio-high-court-
offers-judges-fines-fees-guidance-i1.464641 ?localLinksEnabled=false; see also RACHEL L. MCLEAN
& MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS (2007),
available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/repaying-debtssummary.
pdf; Harris et al., supra note 1 16, at 1782-83 (reporting "that nearly one in four of our
respondents reported having served time in jail as a sanction for nonpayment"); Editorial, The
NewDebtors'Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/200g/04/o6/opinion/
o6mon4.html.
129. This assertion is based partly on a review of case law (see United States v. Montgomery,
532 F-3 d 81 1, 814-15 (8th Cir. 2008)), but more significantly on my personal observations in
state and federal courtrooms.
130. Recently, after a publication by the Ohio chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
found thatjudges often deny defendants a hearing to determine if they are financially capable of
paying what they owe, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a brochure, distributed to all state judges,
reminding them under which conditions they can jail an offender for failure to pay fines,
restitution and other court costs. Ohio High Court Offers Judges Fines, Fees Guidance, supra note 128;
see also OFFICE OFJUDICIAL SERVS., supra note 128.
131. BANNON ETAL., supra note 118, at 21-22. Some judges do not even consider a defendant's
ability to pay before revoking probation or parole for failure to pay criminal debt. Id. at 21.
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foot in the door. Those who are able to meet those challenges are then
confronted with the additional reality that, upon learning this potential
employee has a criminal history, the employer no longer is interested in
entertaining the application for employment. Although it is challenging for
judges to distinguish between individuals who truly are making no effort to
get ajob and those who are genuinely making an effort but are prevented
from employment by daily obstacles, too often courts are taking an offender's
surface-level failure to maintain employment and concluding the result must
be due to the defendant's willful behavior.
Each of the penalties for failing to pay restitution is an element of
criminal punishment: the removal of the right to vote, serve on ajury, run for
public office, and possess a firearm. The suspension of these civil rights is an
action taken by the state subsequent to a criminal conviction, with the result
being a substantial deprivation of her fundamental rights, imposed pursuant
to a statute that reveals an intent to punish, and that also substantially
diminishes a person's well-being by denying them the most basic functions of
citizenship. Being able to participate in the vital roles imparted to us as
members of a democracy-by exercising the right to choose who represents
us in the state and federal legislatures, the presidency and, often, thejudiciary,
or by serving on ajury-is at the heart of citizenship.132 As a result of an order
of restitution, one is denied access to the basic components of citizenship as
well as certain fundamental rights granted by the Constitution, such as being
able to possess a firearm to defend one's person and property. Here, the
denial of these rights is a part of the punishment imposed for a person's
failure to pay restitution.
Similarly, the lingering possibility, or even probability, of renewed
incarceration for the failure to pay a financial obligation imposed as part of a
criminal sentence is punitive. The use of revocation hearings to send someone
back to jail or prison for "willfully" failing to pay is intended to be a
punishment. Even if a person is solely being continued on probation or
supervised release due to a failure to pay, this continued court monitoring is
also intended to punish. Continued court supervision keeps the threat of
incarceration present, while simultaneously subjecting an individual to
continued monitoring and court-imposed sanctions. Legislators and courts
created this as a system of punishment: the threat of incarceration and close
monitoring by an arm of the judiciary are meant to encourage the convicted
defendant to "go straight" or else be punished, even if the defendant breaks
no further laws.
Despite the fairly obvious and intended punitive consequences that
attach to having a restitution obligation imposed as part of a criminal case,
132. See generally ANDREw GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHYJURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE
To CONSTITUTIONAL AcTioN (2012).
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courts continue to avoid invoking the constitutional protections that generally
come with criminal punishment.
B. CRIMINAL RESTITUTION AS PUNISHMENTINAPPLICATION
Beyond the fact that criminal restitution incurs the same consequences
and effects as other criminal punishments, additional indicators also reveal it
to be punishment. Criminal restitution is now being imposed for conduct a
defendant has not been found to have committed beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal proceeding. Specifically, defendants are regularly being
required to pay restitution for acquitted, unproven, and "relevant" conduct,
for indirect or secondary harms, and when there is no actual loss to a victim.
Defendants are also being required to pay for the costs of their own
prosecution as part of their criminal restitution obligations. This Subpart
explores each of those scenarios in more detail.
1. Restitution for Acquitted and Unproven Conduct
Until the mid-iggos, restitution was permitted only for conduct that was
part of the count(s) of conviction.'33 The Supreme Court established in 19go
"that the loss caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction
establishes the outer limits of a restitution order."34 Later that year, in the
wake of the highly-charged Savings and Loan scandal,s5 Congress changed
the law to overrule the Supreme Court on the scope of restitution. The
legislature amended the Victim Witness Protection Act ("VWPA") to allow
courts to impose restitution for losses resulting from "the defendant's
criminal conduct in the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern," when the crime of
conviction "includes as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of
criminal activity."'s 6 The MVRA solidified this change, tracking the amended
VWPA verbatim.
133. See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990); United States v. Streebing, 987
F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 961 (1993). Shortly after the Supreme Court ruled,
lower courts began to find exceptions to this rule. For example, the Ninth Circuit recognized an
exception where the plea agreement specifies a defendant will pay restitution for offenses other
than those for which there is a conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Soderling, 97o F.2d 529,
532-33 (9th Cir. 1992).
134. Hughey, 495 U.S. at 420. Some courts interpreted this rule to limit restitution even where
the offense of conviction involved a scheme as an element of the offense. United States v. Sharp,
941 F.2d 811, 81 4 -1 5 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. As a result of Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, another Supreme
Court decision around the same time as Hughey, which held restitution could be discharged in
bankruptcy proceedings, the legislation was also aimed at not allowing restitution to be
dischargeable. Penn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 4 9 5 U.S. 552 (1990); see also 136 CONG.
REC. H 3 o98 (daily ed.June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. George Gekas). Although Davenport was
a welfare fraud case, emotional arguments were made in favor of these new restitution provisions
by placing them in the context of the Savings and Loan crisis. See id.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (2) (2012); Cf 136 CONG. REC. S9055-62 (daily ed.June 28, 1990)
(letter from National Victim Center to Sen. Don Nickles).
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Congress intended the statutory change to allow restitution to be a major
sentencing tool, a method of "making criminals pay," both literally and
figuratively, "for their crimes."57 As one senator explained, Congress
intended the restitution requirement to "ensure that the criminal not only
pays his debt to society, but he also pays his debt to this victim."',3
Yet the statutory change was just the beginning. Although the statute
authorized courts to expand the imposition of restitution to conduct that was
part of scheme or conspiracy, courts went even further in interpreting the
statutory language. Construing the VWPA and MYRA permissibly, lower
courts have ordered defendants to pay restitution for "acts of related conduct
for which the defendant was not convicted," such as uncharged, acquitted, or
dismissed counts, justifying this accountability by claiming the conduct at
issue in those counts is part of a "scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal
activity."'"'
Federal courts also have interpreted this language to mean that
restitution can be ordered to a victim not named in the indictment,140 for acts
occurring during the same "course of conduct" as the counts of conviction-
even if not close in time and not charged'4'-and for events occurring outside
of the statute of limitations.142 In short, as a result of Congress and judges
working together, there is now little for which a criminal defendant cannot
be ordered to pay restitution, so long as there is some link, even a highly
attenuated one, to the charged conduct.
This far-reaching financial accountability reflects the general shift in the
criminal justice system toward defendants being seen as individuals with
immutable bad character who are likely guilty of something, even if not found
guilty at a criminal trial. Subsequent to the introduction of the federal
sentencing guidelines, which came into effect in 1987, "relevant conduct" has
always been incorporated into calculations of a federal defendant's applicable
sentencing guideline range.'43 Such "relevant conduct" includes "all acts and
137. 136 CONG. REC. S14,657 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1990) (statement of Sen. Don Nickles).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3 d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 2000). But seeUnited States v.
Benns, 740 F. 3 d 370, 377-78 (5 th Cir. 2014) (holding restitution cannot be ordered for relevant
conduct, only for the offense of conviction); United States v. Freeman, 741 F. 3 d 426, 434-35
(4 th Cir. 2014) (holding restitution must be for "victims of the offense of conviction" not
"'relevant conduct,' 'a related offense,' or a 'factually relevant offense'").
140. See, e.g., United States v. Henoud, 81 F.3 d 484, 489 (4 th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Pepper, 51 F-3 d 469, 473 (5 th Cir. 1995); cf United States v. Kones, 77 F.3 d 66, 70 (3 d Cir.
1996); United States v. Reed, 8o F.3 d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1996).
141. United States v. Wright, 496 F.3 d 371, 380 (5 th Cir. 2007) (determining that because
one scheme was "practically identical" to scheme of conviction, other than identity of the victims,
events were part of common scheme or plan and restitution to those victims appropriate).
142. United States v. Dickerson, 37o F.3 d 1330, 1342-43 (1 ith Cir. 2004).
143. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § iB .3 (1987), with U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 11. 3 (2013).
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omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."'44 To be considered part of a
"common scheme or plan," two offenses may be connected to one another by
something so basic as a similar modus operandi or a common purpose.45
"[S]cheme, conspiracy [and] pattern of conduct" are each modern concepts
allowing for broader criminal liability than the actions committed by, or at the
instruction of, an individual defendant. Conspiracy law is so wide it often
eliminates the causal and agency links otherwise required. Defendants can be
held accountable at sentencing for the actions of a co-conspirator, even those
not committed by or foreseeable to the defendant in question.'46
Although commentators andjudges may disagree on the appropriateness
of such wide-ranging accountability, the intent behind this expansion is
plainly punitive. The goal is to punish "criminals" to the full extent possible,
to "make them pay" for committing a crime, and to "make victims of crime
whole."'47 The restitution portion of criminal sentences is a part of that
broader retributive objective. Now that defendants are being required to
compensate for any tangential loss-financial, physical, emotional, hedonic,
or otherwise-that a victim can link back to an offender's behavior, the
legislature and courts essentially hold criminal defendants accountable for
the domino-effect of actions that may have stemmed from her behavior,
whether she was legally held responsible for that behavior or not.
Some may argue that this is no different than what happens in civil
proceedings, and thus, not a cause for concern."'8 Yet, criminal and civil
proceedings are and, in this author's view, should remain fundamentally
distinct. When civil damages become imputable to a criminal case through
criminal restitution, the criminal justice system is used to mitigate what is, in
essence, a dispute between two private parties-the defendant and the victim.
Restitution, therefore, becomes a vehicle for settling a personal dispute, and
thus, a mechanism for personal retribution rather than reparation. This is
especially true when restitution amounts are no longer tied to specific,
144. U.S. SENTENCINc GUIDELINES MANUAL § iBi.3(a)(2) (2013).
145. Id.§ iBi-3cmt.9(A).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3 d 549, 558-59 (3 d Cir. 2013) (holding
defendant financially responsible for co-defendant's relevant conduct, even if not reasonably
foreseeable to him); United States v. Thomas, 69o F.3 d 358, 366-67, 375 (5th Cir. 2012)
(finding defendant's knowledge of conspiracy and amount of drugs can be inferred from
testimony, despite no specific evidence establishing either); United States v. Duncan, 639 F-3 d
764, 768 (7 th Cir. 201 1) (stating in drug context, "reasonable foreseeability" refers to scope of
agreement defendant entered into at beginning of agreement, not what quantity of drugs was
specifically foreseeable to defendant). But see United States v. Figueroa-Labrada, 720 F.3 d 1258,
1263-64 (soth Cir. 2013); United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3 d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2002)
(vacating the district's court sentence for failure to make "particularized findings" relating the
defendant's and co-conspirators' conduct).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Brock-Davis, 504 F.3 d 991, 998 (9 th Cir. 2007).
148. But see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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calculable losses. Unlike the tort system, which aims to address personal
wrongs, the criminal justice system aims to punish and deter conduct the law
deems morally threatening to society as a whole.49 Sanctioning personal
vindication as a goal of a criminal sentencing hearing through restitution
undermines this distinction, positioning the criminal justice system to become
a tool for personal vengeance.o50
Allowing a court to impose financial liabilities on a defendant as part of
a criminal sentencing, on the basis of a criminal conviction for another crime,
with the same collateral consequences that attach to any other criminal
punishment, is punishment. As such, the increased scope of criminal
restitution reveals again the punitiveness of courts' approach to this financial
remedy.
2. Criminal Restitution for Secondary and Indirect Harms
Another variation on how courts are holding criminal defendants
responsible during criminal sentencing proceedings for actions not
necessarily attributable to them and in a manner amounting to punishment
arises in the context of secondary harms. Prior to 2oo8, courts ordered
restitution in criminal cases only when a defendant was the direct source of
harm to the victim or the victim's property. In the past six years, this
requirement has evolved.'5' As a result, courts are ordering defendants to pay
restitution for conduct not directly attributable to them, because it is too
difficult to parse out how much responsibility multiple defendants have for
intangible emotional, psychological, and hedonic harms. After the Supreme
Court's holding in Paroline, this "guesstimation" approach now has the Court's
imprimatur.
As this Article alluded earlier,s2 in the context of cases involving
possession and receipt of child pornography, courts are holding defendants
responsible for harms for which they are only indirectly responsible. Both the
parties and judges have trouble figuring out exactly how much harm an
individual possessor of a child pornography image has caused the person
depicted in that image, and thus, how much restitution the court should order
149. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., Paradigms Lost: TheBlurring ofthe Criminal and Civil Law Models-
And What Can Be Done About It, 1oi YALE L.J. 1875, 1878 (1992); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, o1 YALE L.J. 1795, 1799 (1992); Paul H.
Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility ofDesert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 205-07 (1996).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 42,51(2011) (stating
that a restitutionary recovery should not have a punitive effect); see also id. § 51 cmt. k (stating that
"disgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive remedy").
151. The Supreme Court recently re-affirmed the proximate cause requirement for orders
of restitution. SeeParoline v. United States, 13 4 S. Ct. 1710, 1730 (2014). However, as discussed
supra Part II.B.3 .b, the standard for determining a defendant's financial responsibility remains
incredibly broad, allowing lower courts to determine restitution based on their assessment of a
defendant's "relative culpability." Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1734 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
152. See supra Part II.B. 3 .b.
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the defendant to pay. How much of a victim's financial losses and emotional,
psychological, and hedonic harms are attributable to any one viewer or trader
of child pornography? What harm does circulation of these images cause as
opposed to the harm caused by the initial abuse? How should courts quantify
that harm, either generally or in an individual case? Courts have run the
gamut in their answers to these questions, yet no consistent methodology has
emerged, nor has the Supreme Court required one. The lack of common
logic, method or analysis used to calculate restitution challenges the assertion
that restitution is being measured by "actual losses."
The consistent emerging theme is courts impose compensation in an
attempt to punish defendants and remedy the ongoing harms to the victims
depicted in child pornography, harms the courts attribute to defendants who
view child pornography, even if the defendant was not legally responsible for
the victim's abuse or the dissemination of her image for financial gain. For
example, one court awarded $5000 as a "nominal" award to a defendant
convicted of possessing and distributing child pornography despite the
government's failure to submit "any evidence whatsoever" regarding the
amount of victim losses attributable to that defendant, noting at the same time
that it had "no doubt" that the award was "less than the actual harm" the
defendant had caused.'ss Another court awarded $3ooo each to two victims.'54
The court settled on this amount because "an amount less than $3000 [is]
inconsistent with Congress' findings on the harm to children victims of child
pornography," but "is a level of restitution that the court is confident is
somewhat less than the actual harm this particular defendant caused each
victim, resolving any due process concerns."1ss
Still another court reached $3000 because the amount was "more than
fair and reasonable" as compensation for 18 therapy sessions, or one session
a month for one-and-a-half years.'s 6 The court did not indicate why this
particular defendant should be held responsible for that particular number
of therapy sessions. At least two courts have ordered a "nominal" award-one
court calling its $5ooo amount "nominal damages,"'s7 and the other calling
$ioo a "nominal figure of restitution."15 In other words, without making
153. United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3 d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
154. United States v. Mather, No. 1:o 9 -CR-oo4 12 AWl, 2olo WL 5173029, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
155. Id.
156. United States v. Baxter, 394 F. App'x 377, 379 (9th Cir. 2011).
157. United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607-09 (S.D. Ohio 2s 1) (declining to
award restitution because the government did not establish this defendant was the proximate
cause of Amy's harm, but finding mandatory nature of 18 U.S.C. § 2259 required the payment
of nominal damages), vacated, 518 F. App'x 369 (gth Cir. 2013). Several courts use the terms
"restitution" and "damages" interchangeably. See id.; United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597,
614 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
158. United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 834-35 (W.D. Va. 201o). The court stated
that it was ordering a "nominal figure of restitution in the amount of one hundred dollars," but
in support of its order, stated "the award of one hundred dollars in restitution comports with the
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findings as to exactly what losses a particular defendant has caused, courts are
concluding a defendant who possessed a child pornography image caused
sufficient harm to be required to pay.
Underlying the scattershot approach to determining what portion of the
harm caused by the circulation of child pornography images should be
attributable to an individual defendant is the overwhelming sentiment that
these are "bad" guys. Judges seem to want to hold these individuals
responsible for the offensive and illicit pleasure they assumedly have
experienced as a result of viewing child pornography. As Justice Scalia said
during the Paroline oral argument concerning a defendant convicted of child
pornography possession, "This is a bad guy, and .. .he ought to be punished,
and he ought to give restitution."'59 Courts impose compensation in an
attempt to punish defendants and remedy the ongoing harms to the victims
depicted in child pornography. Courts attribute these ongoing harms to
defendants who view child pornography, even if most of those defendants did
not participate in the direct sexual abuse of the victim or disseminate images
of that abuse for financial gain. In other words, in the context of child
pornography cases, restitution has become intertwined with moral judgment
and vengeance, quintessential characteristics of criminal punishment.
Undoubtedly, deterrence is also a factor. As a society, we want to try to
prevent people from obtaining or passing along child pornography images,
and prevent them from encouraging the market to find more children to
abuse and film. Yet there is more than just deterrence at work when
considering a subject like child pornography. Most people acknowledge an
undeniable desire to punish anyone remotely associated with the sexual abuse
of children, even if those individuals never had any direct unlawful or perverse
contact with any child. In the child pornography context, restitution punishes
the defendant for the fact that child pornography continues to circulate
against the victim's wishes.
Rehabilitation, another characteristic linked to criminal punishment,
also lingers as a goal of restitution. 6oo The Supreme Court has referred to
criminal restitution as "an effective rehabilitative penalty" on multiple
occasions.'@6 In fact, one of the critical penological purposes the Court
attributes to criminal restitution is its ability to "force[] the defendant to
definition and purposes underlying 'nominal damages' in the context of restitution payments."
Id. at 835, 835 n.1o (citations omitted).
159. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014)
(No. 12-8561).
16o. See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 72o F.2d 1327, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("So long, then,
as restitution in any particular case is designed to further rehabilitation of the defendant without
overly sacrificing society's interests in deterrence, retribution and community safety, we should
presumably uphold the order of the trial judge." (citations omitted)).




confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused."6= Restitution
allows courts to "impress upon offenders that their conduct produces
concrete and devastating harms for real, identifiable victims."' 63
Although the criminal justice system purports to be concerned "not only
with punishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating him,"'64
rehabilitation is a nominal goal rather than a true goal of criminal
restitution.' 65 This is especially true in the context of defendants convicted of
any type of sex crime. 66 Legislators' and courts' general rejection of any
concrete and effective efforts at rehabilitation belie the assertion that they
intend restitution to serve a rehabilitative goal-to make the defendant come
to terms with the harms she has caused. Rather, restitution is aimed at
punishing "the bad guy."
Requiring defendants to pay restitution because courts find a particular
criminal act deeply troubling and want to compensate the victim arises most
commonly and visibly in the child pornography context. However, this
expansion of restitution seems to be the beginning of a larger trend in which
victims are pursuing compensation for more attenuated harms. Courts have
162. Robinson, 479 U.S. at 49 n.1o.
163. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1727 (citation omitted).
164. Robinson, 479 U.S. at 52.
165. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 6, at 275-83.
166. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 381 (1997) (Breyer,J., dissenting) (noting
"treatment" was only required by the Kansas sex offender commitment statute after release from
prison, undermining the claim that treatment is an important statutory goal); Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex
Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, g8 CALIF. L. REV. 2093, 2108-22 (2010).
Although legislative language requires "treatment," the on-the-ground reality is very different.
Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices, Characteristics, and Resident
Demographics, 36J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 439 (2oo8). Only 53-78% of those civilly committed receive
treatment. Id. at 447. According to 2008 data, only 28 of the 3200 civilly committed offenders
(o.88%) from responding states had been discharged through treatment, with an additional two
persons to be discharged by the end of the year; six states had not released a single individual. See
Miller, supra, at 2117 n. 144 (citing REBECCAJACKSON ET AL., SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY OF SEX
OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS 32 (2oo8)). "According to a Washington State report,
of the 4534 persons committed or held for evaluation as sexually violent predators nationwide,
only 494 had been discharged or released, and only i 88-or 4 percent-of those under program
staff recommendation." Id. (citing WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, COMPARISON OF STATE
LAws AUTHORIZING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006
UPDATE, REVISED 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/989/Wsipp-
Comparison-of-State-Laws-Authorizing-Involuntary-Commitment-of-Sexually-Violent-Predators-
2oo6-Update-RevisedFull-Report.pdf. The New York Times reported that only 1.7% of committed
sex offenders have been recommended for release:
Nearly 3000 sex offenders have been committed since the first law passed in 1990.
In 18 of the 19 states, about 5o have been released completely from commitment
because clinicians or state-appointed evaluators deemed them ready. Some 115
other people have been sent home because of legal technicalities, court rulings,
terminal illness or old age.
Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/o 4 /us/o4civil.html.
136 [Vol. 1oo:93
]WHAT IS CRIMINAL RESTITUTION?
rejected most of these efforts so far, but they are arising with increasing
frequency in corporate fraud and illegal kickback scheme cases.167 It is easy to
envision a scenario in the relatively near future when victims are regularly
seeking compensation for harms the defendant did not proximately cause in
that particular case. The Sixth Circuit recently upheld a restitution order in a
prescription drug conspiracy case requiring a defendant to pay community
restitution in the amount of $1 million based on the "amount of public harm
caused by the offense."' 68 In imposing this significant amount of community
restitution, the trial court mirrored language in the child pornography
possession cases, elaborating at length about how deeply troubling it found
the distribution of illegal prescription drugs in the state generally, but giving
no indication of the link between the defendant's conduct and the specific,
quantifiable harms to the community attributed to him. 69 Even in a context
less emotionally fraught than child pornography, the underlying punitive
desire remains present.
167. See, e.g., In re Allen, No. 14-40505, 2014 WL 2017780, at *1 (5 th Cir. May 1g, 2014);
United States v. Slovacek, 6gg F.3 d 423, 427 (5 th Cir. 2012); United States v. Stoerr, 695 F. 3 d
271, 281 (3 d Cir. 2012); United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3 d 1301, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 8o6,
8o6 (2012); In re Fisher, 649 F.3 d 401, 405 (5 th Cir. 201 1).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c) (1), (2) (a) (2012); United States v. Leman, Nos. 12-5958, 13-6092,
2014 WL 3746542, at *8 (6th Cir. July 31, 2014). The MVRA allows for community restitution
in drug cases "in which there is no identifiable victim." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(1). Although this
statutory provision has been in place for almost 20 years, only recently have courts begun to
authorize restitution under its auspices. A fairly recent, prior effort by this author to find cases
imposing restitution under this provision was unavailing.
16g. The trial court did not order a criminal fine in the case. Leman, 2014 WL 3746542, at
*8. The defendant argued on appeal that the $i million restitution amount, which by statute,
may not "exceed the amount of the fine which may be ordered for the offense charged in the
case," see 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(2) (B), violated the statute on its face. Leman, 2014 WL 3746542,
at *8. Applying a plain error analysis, the Court rejected the defense argument, as the statutory
amount authorized was $1 million, even though the trial court did not impose that amount. See
id. Rather, the trial judge indicated that because, "there's a whole community and culture that's
been devastated by this criminal activity," and "a lot of pain that comes from the decisions [Mr.
Leman] made," he would order community restitution. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, at 87,
101, United States v. Leman, No. 7:10-CR-ooolo (GFVT) (E.D. Ky. 2012). In authorizing its
order, the trial court spoke at length about its motivations for the restitution portion:
It is hard for me to overstate the devastation caused by the diversion of legal drugs
for illegal purposes in our community. In the commonwealth of Kentucky, twice as
many people die from drug overdoses as they do from car accidents. It's a stunning
statistic. We're ravaged by it. It touches everyone in some form. People die because
of this criminal activity. People's lives are ruined, and there's a generational impact
where generations of Kentuckians are held in bondage to this addiction. ... [You]
owe us a debt.
Id. at 89, 91. The court ordered 65% of the $1 million to go to the Kentucky Crime Victims
Compensation Board, and 35% to the Kentucky Department of Mental Health's Division of Substance
Abuse. Id. at lo5. Neither the government nor the court pointed to any specific harms attributable to
the defendant resulting in the $1 million amount. See, e.g., id. at 45-51, 87, 8g-go, 91-92, 101. But see
id. at 97 ("[Pleople got hurt because of the distribution, illegally, of these drugs.").
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3. Restitution Required Even When No Actual Loss to Victim
Another marker of how courts and legislatures regularly apply criminal
restitution as punishment occurs when restitution is ordered even though the
victim has not claimed a loss. Often, these are cases in which the court orders
restitution to a third party, such as an insurance company or state or federal
agency, for coverage they provided to the victim as a result of the offender's
crime. In these scenarios, the victim has no unmitigated losses to be covered.
Normally, this type of reimbursement would be pursued through the civil
system, but because the rules for criminal restitution are so loose, companies
can pursue compensation through the criminal sentencing hearing, thereby
engaging in an end-run around the civil system. Although the third party
would certainly support an argument requiring convicted defendants to cover
their costs, criminal courtjudges assumedly require a more compelling reason
to order compensation to companies through a criminal sentencing process.
The most logical reason to require criminal restitution payments to third
parties is to require the offender to suffer an additional financial loss in order
to right the moral imbalance her actions caused.
In a representative case out of Hawai'i, the defendant repeatedly stabbed
his wife, an active-duty member of the United States Army, almost killing
her.o17 She was treated at a civilian medical center, and then transferred to an
army medical center, where she received further surgery, occupational
therapy, and mental health treatment.'7' Because of her military service, she
received her medical and mental health treatment free of charge. However,
the army medical center sought, and the court ordered, payment for the costs
of providing her medical care.
Upholding the restitution order, the Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that
the victim would have been able to seek reimbursement had she been
responsible to pay for her own care, even though she did not pay for her own
care in this case.'17 According to the court, "a defendant must, in every case
involving bodily injury, pay what it costs to care for the victim, whether or not
the victim paid for the care or was obligated to do so."17s Even though the
victim in the case suffered no financial loss, " [h] er personal injuries generated
the expenses," and thus, "[flunctionally, under this statutory scheme, she
thereby incurred those expenses as a loss and received compensation by way
of the government's payments for her care."'74 As a result, "the court must
require the defendant to 'pay an amount equal to the cost' of necessary
170. United States v. Cliatt, 338 F.3 d io8g, 1ogo (gth Cir. 2003).
171. Id.
172. Id. at ogi.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1093.
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medical and similar care rendered to the victim" when the victim suffers
bodily injury.'m
Requiring offenders to pay restitution despite an absence of actual loss
to the direct victim does not only happen in the context of serious bodily
injury. For example, in a 2002 case out of Washington State, the court
ordered the defendant to pay restitution for property damage caused by a fire
resulting from the operation of a methamphetamine laboratory.'76 Although
he was one of three defendants participating in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine at the home, leased by one of his co-defendants, the
defendant was not present at the time the fire started and had no role in the
fire, which began when a co-defendant placed a jar of chemicals on a
hotplate.'77 As a result of the fire, an insurance company paid the owner of
the house for the damage.'78 The district court ordered each defendant to pay
restitution to the insurance company for the amount paid to the owner.'79
The circuit court affirmed.,so The appellate court found the insurance
company was a victim under the statute, and the defendant's conduct "created
the circumstances under which the harm or loss occurred," even though he
was not the direct cause of the fire.' 8'
There are several issues in the aforementioned scenarios worth
unpacking. The first is whether the third party-be it a hospital, insurance
company, or other individual-should be considered a victim for purposes of
criminal restitution statutes. It returns us to the fundamental question of what
legislatures and courts intend restitution to do. Is restitution fundamentally a
restorative mechanism, aimed at making victims whole, or a punitive one,
aimed at making a defendant pay any party related to the victim for having
committed the crime? If legislatures and courts intend restitution to disgorge
the unlawful benefit a defendant received as a result of her criminal action,
restitution to either the direct victim or the third party would not be
appropriate here. If restitution is intended to "make a victim whole" by
requiring a defendant to compensate the victim for harms and injuries
directly resulting from her criminal action,' 8' again, restitution would not be
appropriate in either of these instances, as the defendant directly harmed
neither the medical center nor the insurance company. Rather, the only
rational reason to require a defendant to pay restitution to a third party is as
a form of punishment.
175. Id. at 1ogi (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3 663 A(b) (2) (2012)).
176. United States v. Hackett, 311 F.3 d 989, 993 (9 th Cir. 2002).
177. Id. at 99o-.
178. Id. at 9 1.
179. Id.
i8o. Id. at 993.
181. Id. at 992-93 (quoting United States v. Spinney, 795 F.2d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986)).
182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Restitution has never been intended to make any person or entity who
helps the victim whole. If we are broadening "restitution" to compensate any
agency, insurance company, family member, friend, or other entity who offers
help to a victim of crime, even when the helper is contractually obligated to
assist the victim, the term "restitution" begins to be so attenuated that it ceases
to be restitution and starts to resemble a much broader version of civil
damages.
The second issue worth interrogating is whether the hospital or
insurance company should be able to seek reimbursement from the person
responsible for the harms in the criminal system.8s The critical question is
not whether these institutions should be allowed to recover their costs, but
whether the criminal process is the appropriate mechanism to use for such
compensation. Ordinarily, a hospital or insurance company would seek
damages through the civil system for expenses incurred in treating the
woman. But in these instances, judges agree to circumvent that process and
order reimbursement through the criminal sentencing process.
Incorporating civil proceedings into criminal sentencing hearings is not
an unusual occurrence, but it is cause for concern. Increasingly, private
parties are requesting, and judges are allowing, civil disputes to be brought
under the auspices of the criminal justice system. The result is that civil
damages have morphed into criminal punishment through restitution. Using
restitution, third parties are seeking to intervene in a criminal case, and
restitution has become a backdoor way of bringing a civil-damages proceeding
between two private parties into a criminal sentencing.18 4
Different from the consequences of a civil proceeding, however, the
results of a criminal restitution hearing are incorporated into a criminal
judgment and commitment order. In criminal cases, courts impose restitution
as part of a sentence pursuant to a prosecution brought by the people, the
state, or the United States on behalf of society, and the end result is intended
to benefit notjust the victim or a third party, but all of us. In other words, the
purpose of a court's action at a criminal sentencing is simply and
183. In its recent Paroline opinion, the Supreme Court rejected a parallel argument, finding
that multiple defendants should not be required to seek contribution or reimbursement from
one another in an instance where many people were convicted of contributing to the same harm:
"[T] here is scant authority for [the] contention that offenders convicted in different proceedings
in different jurisdictions and ordered to pay restitution to the same victim may seek contribution
from one another. There is no general federal right to contribution. Nor does the victim point
to any clear statutory basis for a right to contribution in these circumstances." Paroline v. United
States, 13 4 S. Ct. 1710, 1725 (2014) (citations omitted).
184. In fact, crime victims have regularly sought to intervene and to be heard at a defendant's
sentencing hearing and as part of the appellate process, but typically, those requests are denied.
See, e.g., United States v. Slovacek, 699 F.3 d 423, 426-27 (5 th Cir. 2012); United States v. Stoerr,
695 F.3 d 271, 281 (3 d Cir. 2012); United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3 d 1301,
1307 (1 1th Cir, 2012); In reAndrich, 668 F.3 d 1o50, 1051 (9th Cir. 2011); cf United States v.
Perry, 360 F.3 d 519, 539 (6th Cir. 2004).
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fundamentally different than the goal in a civil case.'18 The goal of criminal
restitution is some combination of retribution, moral condemnation,
deterrence, and compensation, and the effects and consequences that attach
to that restitution order are the same as they are for other criminal
punishments. Thus, when the criminal court issues a criminal sentencing
order requiring a criminal defendant to pay what amounts to civil damages to
a third party, that criminal restitution order carries with it all the things that
attach to a criminal conviction-moral condemnation, societal stigma, and
the collateral consequences of criminal punishment. 86
Because of the fundamentally different goals and consequences of
criminal punishment and civil damages,187 when civil damages become
imputable to a criminal case, restitution is encouraged to become a vehicle
for retribution rather than reparation. With restitution amounts being only
loosely tied to the criminal actions of a criminal defendant and the losses of a
crime victim, the motivation to impose financial remedies extends beyond
simple compensation. Rather, the motivation for imposing restitution in these
cases seems to be a desire to hold someone accountable for the harms a victim
has experienced. Thus, even when the victim suffers no out-of-pocket
expenses, a court can still order restitution to a third party.
In fact, it is not uncommon for a victim who has already received payment
from the defendant in a civil suit or other settlement to obtain restitution in
the criminal case from that same defendant, for that same amount. Because
her losses have been reimbursed, she no longer has a financial loss at the time
of the criminal sentencing. Yet courts regularly find that a private or civil
settlement between "a criminal wrongdoer" and the victim "does not preclude
a district court from imposing a restitution order for the same underlying
wrong."18
If the goal of restitution is truly to compensate a victim's losses, no
justification exists for requiring payment to a victim who has experienced no
financial loss, or has already had that loss reimbursed by a third party. Instead,
restitution is a financial penalty imposed in an effort to "make the defendant
pay" for his actions by compensating either the victim or a third party. In this
scenario, no other justification can explain the imposition of restitution. The
defendant has already compensated the victim for her loss in a civil hearing,
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 42, 51 (2011)
(stating that restitution should not have a punitive effect); id. § 51 cmt. k (stating that
"[d]isgorgement of wrongful gain is not a punitive remedy").
186. See, e.g., Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences,
looJ. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213 (2010).
187. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 149, at 1878; Mann, supra note 149, at 1799; Robinson,
supra note 149, at 205-07.
188. United States v. Bearden, 274 F.3 d 1031, 1041 (6th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Gallant, 537 F.3 d 1202, 1249-50 (ioth Cir. 2oo8); United States v. Sheinbaum, 136 F. 3 d 443,
447-48 (5 th Cir. 1998); Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp.2d 107, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2012).
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yet she is being required to do so again through the criminal restitution
process. These cases reveal the implausibility of claiming that restitution is a
restorative mechanism. Restitution cannot credibly be a restorative
mechanism aimed at repayment when the victim has not suffered any losses
for which she is seeking reimbursement.
Courts are compelling defendants to answer for a much broader range
of losses than those for which they are legally accountable, including those
claimed by individuals and entities that did not suffer the experience of being
mistreated by a criminal defendant, or who that defendant has already
reimbursed for those losses. Disgorgement of unlawful gains no longer is
anywhere in this restitution picture, and even compensation of losses aimed
at aiding victims remains on the periphery of the new restitution landscape.
The aim is moral condemnation and retribution, the principle that each
defendant deserves to be punished because she is morally culpable for all the
ramifications of her actions, no matter how far beyond the victim the
vibrations of this tolling bell reach.
4. "Reimbursement" of State Investigations and Prosecutions
One other common scenario reveals how criminal restitution is being
imposed in a manner that consistently results in punitive effects. In many
states, legislatures have passed statutes allowing courts to order defendants to
pay "restitution" to the state for the costs of investigating and prosecuting the
crime(s) with which they are charged. 89 Applying the definition of
punishment outlined earlier, this Subpart will show how restitution being
imposed as reimbursement for prosecution and investigation costs constitutes
punishment: it is a state action, subsequent to a criminal allegation, resulting
in a substantial deprivation and/or obligation, and is imposed in a retributive
manner.
Increasingly, in states across the country, criminal justice systems are
charging criminal defendants for various costs associated with investigating,
prosecuting, detaining, and releasing them.190 Defendants are regularly
189. This is part of a larger trend toward imposing ever greater "legal financial obligations,"
or "LFOs," on criminal defendants. See, e.g., Logan & Wright, supra note 13. This trend becomes
especially troubling when criminal justice systems rely on the income from these financial
penalties to meet their budgets for ordinary system operations. For a thoughtful, more in-depth
discussion of the larger issues related to LFOs, see id
190. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 118; Plunkett, supra note 1 18, at 59-60. This author
is not advocating that every one of the costs associated with prosecuting, investigating, detaining
and releasing a defendant should be subject to constitutional protections. Despite a few
detractors, most recognize criminal restitution's fundamental nature as punishment. By way of
contrast, most would likely contest that the costs highlighted here are punitive in intent.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has permitted states to recoup from a defendant the costs of
representation. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974); cf James v. Strange, 92 S. Ct. 2027,
2030 (1972) (rejecting Kansas' recoupment statute but declining to make "any broadside
pronouncement on [the recoupment statute's] general validity"). Although this author takes
issue with each of these and other types of "reimbursement," during the prosecution through
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charged with prosecution "reimbursement" fees, costs ofjudicial proceedings,
criminal defense, bail, booking, incarceration, probation supervision, and
various other services.'o' These are costs that are incurred on top of any other
financial sanctions imposed, such as criminal fines, forfeiture, restitution to
crime victims, or other penalties. The justifications for such requirements
often include the mounting costs of increasing criminalization and
penalization policies our society has implemented, the limited budgets most
jurisdictions experience, and the underlying belief "that it is unfair for
criminals to get a free ride while blameless citizens may go without housing
and food."192
Although many states and municipalities justify imposing restitution in
this manner by noting the lean economic times and tightening budgets, upon
closer inspection, this logic does not hold up. Given the indigence of most
criminal defendants, the likelihood of collecting anything from current or
prior inmates is relatively small.'os These programs would not be part of any
viable financial model. Rather, it is the particularly punitive and retributive
sentiment of the "criminal" getting a "free ride" that allows such policies to be
implemented.
Categorizing these court-imposed financial obligations as "restitution"
also does not fit particularly well into the criminaljustice framework. In typical
cases of restitution, there is a prosecution brought by the state, and a third
party who is a victim. Criminal restitution statutes always have focused on the
victim, as prosecution costs are part of state and local budgets. Cases without
harm to a third party are typically called "victimless crimes," because the
government is not generally considered a "victim" according to the common
understanding of the term. If we were to accept the premise that the
government is a victim in every case they prosecute, then the government
would be a victim in every single criminal case, a logic that simply does not
work. '94
North Carolina has made fairly prominent use of laws requiring
defendants to pay "restitution" for the costs of investigating and prosecuting
the crimes they are alleged to have committed. In any case involving the use
of lab testing-drug testing, DNA testing, and blood alcohol content testing,
for example-North Carolina requires a convicted defendant to pay the state
post-conviction supervision process, this Article is not advocating here the extension of
constitutional protections to most of these other costs.
191. Plunkett, supra note i 18, at 59.
192. Id. at 69.
193. See Desiree Evans, Doing Time on Their Own Dime: More States Charge Inmates for Stays in
Jail, Prison, INST. FOR S. STUD. (May 19, 2009), http://www.southernstudies.org/2oog/o 5 /doing-
time-on-their-own-dime-more-states-charge-inmates-for-stays-in-jail-prison.html; Nate Rawlings,
Welcome to Prison. Will You Be Paying Cash or Credit?, TIME (Aug. 21, 2013), http://nation.time.
com/2013/08/21/welcome-to-prison-will-you-be-paying-cash-or-credit.
194. Plunkett, supra note i 18, at g1.
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$6oo for the costs of conducting lab tests that are a routine part of most
criminal investigations.,95 On the surface, $6oo is "reimbursement" not
"punishment," as it is intended to "pay back" the state for the costs of the
testing required for the state to prove its case. But local courts have declined
to require the government to proffer evidence of the testing costs, claiming
the statutory language allowing for $600 is sufficient "evidence" of the
amount to be reimbursed.'96
The unexamined acceptance of $6oo as the actual cost of every single
laboratory test-a simple blood alcohol test as well as the mass spectrometer
and gas chromatograph test used to determine the content of drugs or a
restriction fragment length polymorphism used to analyze DNA-seems a
stretch, raising the issue of whether the $600 restitution ordered in criminal
cases truly is reimbursement. It is quite unlikely that a blood alcohol test costs
the same as highly advanced drug-testing technology. If the true aim of North
Carolina's restitution provision were reimbursement, one would assume the
state would make some effort to ascertain the actual costs of the testing.
Against the backdrop of cash-strapped justice systems, high arrest rates, and
retributive intent, the fact that a set amount is ordered every time, without
any evidentiary proof to support it, suggests that the purpose of ordering
restitution is something other than reimbursement of the cost of a procedure.
Statutory language supports the idea that the legislature is using
restitution as punishment. This statute is located in a general "court costs"
section. The imposition of court costs is considered part of the punishment
imposed, and the money typically goes toward maintaining the court system
195. North Carolina courts have read two statutes in conjunction with one another to reach
this conclusion. See, e.g., State v. Fennell, No. COAi 1-1148, 2012 WL 698252, *3 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 4 (a)(7) (2013) ("[I]n cases in which, as part of the
investigation leading to the defendant's conviction, the [State Bureau of Investigation laboratory
facilities] have performed DNA analysis of the crime, tests of bodily fluids of the defendant for
the presence of alcohol or controlled substances, or analysis of any controlled substance
possessed by the defendant or the defendant's agent . . . . the district or superior court judge
shall, upon conviction, order payment of the sum of six hundred dollars to be remitted to the
Department of Justice for support of the [State Bureau of Investigation]."); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15 A-13 4 3 (d) (requiring a defendant to "make restitution or reparation to an aggrieved party
or parties who shall be named by the court for the damage or loss caused by the defendant arising
out of the offense or offenses committed by the defendant . . . [where restitution means]
restitution or reparation to an aggrieved party or parties who shall be named by the court for the
damage or loss caused by the defendant arising out of the offense or offenses committed by the
defendant . . . [and] 'aggrieved party' includes individuals, firms, corporations, associations,
other organizations, and agencies, whether federal, State or local"); State v. Stallings, 335 S.E.2d
344 (N.C. App. 1985) (holding that under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15 A-13 4 3 (d) damage or loss to
government agencies must be "over and above its normal operating costs" (citations omitted)).
196. See, e.g., Fennel, 2012 WL 698252, at *3 ("The trial court's restitution order . .. was
supported by the following evidence presented at trial: . . . the Pender County Sheriffs Office
sent the drugs purchased by the informant to the State Crime Laboratory for identification. This
evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's order of restitution." (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-304(a)(7) (2011); State v. Moore, 715 S.E.2d 847, 849 (N.C. 201 1)).
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and support of court personnel.97 In most states, these miscellaneous court
fees are not broken down, but lumped together into one payment ordered at
sentencing, titled "court costs" or "fees." As such, the funds are not considered
reimbursement. The presence of the statute ordering $6oo to the State
Bureau of Investigation for every case with testing in the "court costs" section
belies the notion that it is intended to be reimbursement.
Law enforcement agencies, and the laboratories that operate under their
aegis, are state agencies tasked with the job of investigating crimes. They are
representatives of the state, the "public," paid by the state for the work they
do, and the expenses associated with their work are paid for by state budgets.
Their investigations are for the benefit of public safety and order, and as such,
are paid for by state revenue.'s8 Yet, in North Carolina, defendants, usually
indigent defendants, are being required to cover these routine investigative
costs, along with other costs to support the everyday operations of the criminal
justice system, including a fee for "maintenance of misdemeanors in county
jails."99
North Carolina is not the only place where restitution is being used to
cover the costs of investigating and prosecuting a defendant's crime. oo With
little discussion, an Ohio state appellate court upheld a restitution order
requiring the defendant to "pay back" the "buy money" used by a confidential
informant to facilitate controlled purchases of drugs by the defendant.2o1 In a
197. See, e.g., Alkire v. Irving, 33o F.3 d 802, 816-18 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing
imprisonment for failing to pay court costs, in addition to fines); In re Thompson, 16 F.3 d 576,
579 (4 th Cir. 1994) (finding court costs imposed as part of criminal sentence are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings); United States v. Dyke, go F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir.
i9go) (holding assessment of court costs is part of criminal sentencing under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines).
The other provisions of this particular statutory section also require convicted defendants to
pay $12 for the use of the courtroom, $4 for the maintenance of the judicial and county
courthouse phone systems, $6.25 for retirement and insurance benefits of state and local law
enforcement officers, and $0oo if the defendant is convicted of a second or subsequent crime,
among other costs. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 4 (a) (2013).
198. According to a 2010 study by the Tax Policy Center, the largestsources of state revenue come
from transfers from the federal government and some local governments. SeeTAX PoucY CTR., URBAN
INST. & BROOKINGS INST., THiE TAX POLcY BOOK iv-1-1 (201 2), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.
org/briefing-book/TPCbiefingbookfull.pdf. Sales and gross receipt taxes were the next biggest
source, followed by individual and corporate income taxes. See id. The individual income tax and
payroll taxes constitute the bulk of the federal government's revenue. See id. at 1-1-i.
199. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-304 (a)(2b).
2oo. See, e.g., People v. Palomo, 272 P. 3 d i 1o6 (Colo. App. 2011); Leyritz v. State, 93 So. 3d
1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 917 A.2d 332 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2007); Arnold v. State, 306 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1957).
201. State v. Middlebrooks, No. 201o AP o8 0026, 2011 WL 39303o8, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
201 1). But see State v. Frazier, No. 1oCA1 5 , 2011 WL 856964, at *1, *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 201 1)
(finding trial court committed plain error when it ordered defendant to pay restitution to
compensate the police department for "money it voluntarily gave a confidential informant to
purchase drugs" from the defendant because "a law enforcement agency is not a 'victim' [under
state law] when it voluntarily spends its own funds to pursue a drug buy through an informant").
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different type of case, the Eighth Circuit endorsed a restitution order in an
anthrax-scare case out of Iowa. A defendant was convicted of sending an
envelope containing white powder to a local police department, which
threatening language indicated was anthrax.202 The Iowa State Hygienic Lab
tested the powder and determined it was baby powder and carpet cleaner.sos
The district judge ordered the defendant to pay $1401.44 to the lab for
testing the powder.204 In upholding the district court's order, the circuit
observed, "it is now firmly established that a unit of government directly and
proximately harmed by a qualifying offense can be awarded restitution under
the MVRA."2s
Thus, in numerous settings, criminal defendants are now being required
to cover routine investigative costs under the guise of restitution orders.2o6
Although states may claim a purely restorative, financial motivation, or even a
deterrent one, on closer inspection, such assertions do not bear weight.
Certainly the money benefits cash-strapped states, especially in difficult
economic times, and helps them provide the services necessary for the
implementation of the criminal justice system. But the motivation is certainly
not, in the main, restorative. Rather, given the practical realities of how much
202. United States v. Haileselassie, 668 F-3 d 1033, 1034 (8th Cir. 2012).
203. Id.
204. Id. The Ninth Circuit has gone a step farther, requiring a defendant to pay restitution
to the United States Postal Service, for lost employee work hours when the facility had to be
evacuated due to the anthrax scare, and to the state Hazardous Materials Division team who
responded to the scene, in addition to paying for the costs of testing the powder. United States
v. De La Fuente, 353 F.3 d 766, 768-69, 772-74 (9 th Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit upheld a
comparable restitution order. United States v. Quillen, 3 3 5 F-3 d 219 (3d Cir. 2003).
205. Haieselassie, 668 F.3 d at 1036. Interestingly, the federal appeals court went on to
distinguish the circumstances of this particular case, purportedly involving an "imminent threat"
to safety, from cases, such as those in North Carolina and Ohio, where a defendant pays
restitution for the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense. The Court noted, "[t]he
cost of determining if an imminent threat to the safety of government workers or operations
exists is a true involuntary victim cost directly and proximately caused by this type of offense." Id.
In contrast, costs of investigating and prosecuting offenses are "voluntary cost[s] of criminal
investigation for which restitution may not be ordered." Id. at 1036-37; see also Frazier, 201 1 WL
856964, at *5-6.
In the context of determining whether restitution is punishment, the distinction between
"voluntary" and "involuntary" costs is negligible. Under the definition of punishment relied on
throughout, the sole issue raised by this distinction is the court's intent in ordering defendants
to pay these costs. The court's distinction between voluntary and involuntary costs turns on
whether a defendant's actions posed an unexpected threat to the safety of government workers
and facilities, making them an "involuntary," instead of a "voluntary," victim. Ordering restitution
solely in cases where state agencies are "involuntary" victims is unrelated to the issue of whether
restitution should compensate state agencies for damages. Rather, such a distinction only further
reveals punitive intent--courts are punishing defendants only when they are seen as creating an
"imminent threat" of harm.
206. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 548 (1993) (ordering the defendant in
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota to pay costs of prosecution, incarceration and
supervised release).
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money states earn from indigent defendants, the punitive motivation for
requiring a criminal defendant to pay for the costs of the investigation and
prosecution of her own case is evident.
If we return to the definition of punishment outlined earlier, the
imposition of restitution in this context falls within its ambit. Restitution is
imposed pursuant to a state action, subsequent to a criminal conviction,
resulting in a substantial deprivation and/or obligation for indigent
defendants, pursuant to a statute that, although not clearly punitive on its
face, is imposed in a manner intended to communicate retribution and moral
condemnation.
One circuit court has acknowledged as much. In a case adjudicated prior
to a change in North Carolina law allowing government entities to receive
restitution, the Fourth Circuit agreed that imposing restitution for expenses
incurred during the investigation of a case was punitive and imposing it would
be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.o7 The Fourth Circuit not only
declined to find the North Carolina Bureau of Investigation a "victim of
crime," but found the imposition of restitution for "expenses in investigating
[ ] drug offenses .. . among its normal operating costs" and therefore not
imposed "for rehabilitative purposes" or "the compensation of victims of
crime."208
State courts may continue to deny that the investigation and prosecution
of a case are "normal operating costs,"2og but that denial rings hollow,
especially in light of statistics that reveal, for example, that 20% of arrests in
207. Evans v. Garrison, 657 F.2d 64 (4 th Cir. 1981).
208. Id. at 66-67. The state courts' readings of the two North Carolina statutes currently in
force seem to skirt around the Fourth Circuit's ruling by: (i) the legislature's inclusion of
government agencies" in the list of "aggrieved part[ies]" entitled to receive restitution, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15 A-13 4 3 (d) (2013); and (2) statutory language holding that "no government
agency shall benefit by way of restitution except for particular damage or loss to it over and above
its normal operating costs," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15 A-1 3 4 0.37 (emphasis added).
For example, in one case, the court upheld a restitution order requiring the defendant to pay
the state Bureau of Investigation the amount of money the state used to purchase drugs from the
defendant in an undercover buy. Finding this was "over and above" the SBI's "normal operating
costs," the court elaborated, "[m]oney expended and not recovered by undercover SBI agents
making a buy to obtain evidence necessary to an arrest for illicit drug operations is a 'particular
damage or loss to it,' and not part of the agency's 'normal operating costs.'" State v. Stallings, 335
S.E.2d 344, 347 (N.C. App. 1985). The court continued, " '[n]ormal operating costs' would
include the salaries and compensation of agents, acquisition and maintenance of vehicles and
other equipment, and office and administrative expenses but not money used by undercover
agents to purchase illicit drugs." Id.
209. See, e.g., State v. Fennell, No. COAi 1-1 148, 2012 WL 698252, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar.
6, 2012) (holding money used to buy drugs could be ordered as part of restitution); State v.
Stallings, 335 S.E.2d 344, 347 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a restitution award may include
"[m]oney expended and not recovered by undercover[]agents making a buy to obtain evidence
necessary to an arrest for illicit drug operations").
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North Carolina over the past year were for drug crimes.2 o Nationally, as of
2007, more arrests were made for drug crimes than any other type of crime.211
Drug crimes are the bread and butter of most law enforcement agencies.
Thus, there can be little question that, in many cases both in North Carolina
and elsewhere, when restitution is being imposed to reimburse the costs of
investigating and prosecuting a defendant's case, restitution is being imposed
in a punitive manner.
Increasingly, states are implementing laws compelling criminal
defendants to cover routine investigative and prosecution costs. Despite
arguments made to the contrary, a closer look at the statutes directing
restitution be imposed in this way, and court decisions upholding these laws
and their execution, confirms the increasing use of restitution as punishment
pursuant to a defendant's conviction.
IV. CRIMINAL RESTITUTION SHOULD BE AFFORDED CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS
Despite its increasingly punitive nature, criminal restitution has not been
granted the constitutional protections normally afforded to criminal
punishments. A review of judicial opinions reveal that judges remain
conflicted as to what role restitution plays, and whether it should operate as
punishment, reimbursement, or both. Marked resistance to embracing
restitution's punitive role remains. Although the source of such reluctance is
unclear, one possibility is that conceding restitution's role as punishment
would mean acknowledging necessary constitutional protections are not in
place. Employing constitutional protections for restitution would
fundamentally change sentencing procedures and remove a level of judicial
discretion in the sentencing decision. Given criminal restitution's regular use
as punishment, however, such changes are now due.
Leadership from the Supreme Court on this issue is necessary, as the
Supreme Court's precedent on the fundamental character of restitution is
muddled. Over the past 25 years, the Supreme Court has set forth conflicting
views on criminal restitution's fundamental purpose. On multiple occasions,
the Court affirmatively embraced restitution's punitive role.2.2 In other cases,
210. According to the North Carolina Department of Corrections, of the 12,369 prison entries in
the DOC system between June 1, 2012, and May 31, 2013, 4275 were for drug crimes. See Automated
System Query, DPS REs. & PLANNING, http://webapps6.doc.state.nc.us/apps/asqExt/ASQ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2014). Across the country, drug offenders comprised approximately 34% of all felony
convictions in state courts, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. See Drugs and Crime Facts,
BuREAU OFJUsT. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/ptrpa.cfin (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
211. See Drugs and Crime Facts, supra note 2 10.
212. The Court declared in 2004 that the purpose of criminal restitution is to "mete out
appropriate criminal punishment." Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 365 (2005). This
assertion was made in the context of the Court determining whether depriving a foreign
government of tax revenue constitutes wire fraud. Likewise, in a 1986 case discussing whether
restitution orders abate, the Court elaborated, "[t]he criminal justice system is not operated
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the Court has asserted with equal force that criminal restitution's primary
purpose is compensatory.- Thus, the Supreme Court appears conflicted in
its view of restitution's purpose.
This tension in the Court's jurisprudence is not surprising in light of the
significant evidence that criminal restitution was envisioned to serve dual
purposes: compensation and punishment. In fact, recently, the Court seems
to have explicitly acknowledged criminal restitution's twin aims. Although
asserting that its "primary goal" is compensatory, the Court confirms that
criminal restitution "serves a punitive purpose" as well.= 4 The dual intent
should not relieve the Court from acknowledging restitution's central role in
punishment, however, or from applying the constitutional safeguards that
accompany other forms of punishment.
Now that the Supreme Court again has acknowledged criminal
restitution's role as punishment, it should take the next step and recognize
the constitutional protections that must adhere to criminal restitution light of
its punitive character.
A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENTAPPLES TO CRIMINAL REsTITUTIoN
Criminal restitution should be subject to the jury trial right of the Sixth
Amendment, just as any other criminal punishment is. The Supreme Court's
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that "other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."ns5 In Southern Union Co. v. United States, one of
the most recent cases to elucidate the contours of the jury trial right, the Court
found Sixth Amendment protections applicable to criminal fines, because a
fine is a criminal penalty.2' 6 As such, any fact that increases the maximum
primarily for the benefit of victims, but for the benefit of society as a whole.... [T] he decision
to impose restitution generally does not turn on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of the
State and the situation of the defendant." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986). As a result,
"[b]ecause criminal proceedings focus on State's interests in rehabilitation and punishment,
rather than the victim's desire for compensation, we conclude that restitution orders imposed in
such proceedings operate 'for the benefit of the State. Similarly, they are not assessed 'for ...
compensation' of the victim." Id. at 53.
213. In 199o, four years after declaring restitution a criminal punishment operated for the
benefit of the state, and in the context of whether restitution could be ordered for losses other
than those caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction, the Court found
restitution's intent was to "restor [e] someone to a position he occupied before a particular event."
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (19go). In other words, restitution's aim was "to
compensate victims." Id. Again in 2010, the Court declared of the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act: "[Tihe statute seeks primarily to assure that victims of a crime receive full restitution... .[It]
seeks speed primarily to help the victims of crime and only secondarily to help the defendant."
Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 613 (2010).
214. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1726 (2014).
215. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
216. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
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amount of a criminal fine must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.217 Applying the same logic results in the undeniable conclusion that
the Sixth Amendment should apply to restitution as well.
Yet, every circuit court to consider whether the Sixth Amendment applies
to criminal restitution has declined to grant this constitutional protection.1 8
That has remained true even in light of the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence acknowledging that any finding that increases a defendant's
punishment violates the Constitution.2l9 As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged,
only a decision by a higher court-either the Supreme Court or an en banc
circuit court-seems likely to change that:
Our precedents are clear that Apprendi [v. New Jersey] doesn't apply
to restitution, but that doesn't mean our caselaw's well-harmonized
with Southern Union. Had Southern Union come down before our
cases, those cases might have come out differently. Nonetheless, our
panel can't base its decision on what the law might have been. Such
rewriting of doctrine is the sole province of the court sitting en
banc.220
Prior to Southern Union, the critical issue for most courts was not
restitution's fundamental character as criminal punishment or a civil
sanction. In fact, a majority of circuits accept criminal restitution's punitive
character.2.1 Rather, courts' reluctance to extend Apprendi's Sixth
217. Id. at 2348. Ten circuits have rejected the Sixth Amendment's application to criminal
restitution on the ground that it contains no statutory maximum sentence. See United States v.
Leahy, 438 F-3 d 328, 337-38 (3 d Cir. 2oo6) (en banc); United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F-3 d 390
(ist Cir. 2oo6); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3 d 65, 118-20 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Williams, 445 F. 3 d 1302, 13o-11 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bussell, 414 F.3 d 1048,
so6o (9 th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garza, 429 F-3 d 165, 170 (5 th Cir. 2005) (per curiam);
United States v. George, 403 F.3 d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Miller, 419 F.3 d 791,
792-93 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3 d 451, 454, 4 61 (6th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Wooten, 377 F.3 d 1134, 1144-45 (ioth Cir. 2004). Fundamentally, this approach fails
to recognize that "restitution in any amount greater than zero clearly increases the punishment
that could otherwise be imposed." Leahy, 428 F.3 d at 342-43 (McKee,J., dissenting). Under the
current federal restitution statutes, a defendant is required to pay the crime victim back for "the
full amount of each victim's losses--someone has to make a factual determination as to what the
"full amount" is. See id.
218. See United States v. Jarjis, No. 13-1430, 2014 WL 260321, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Jan. 24,
2014) (per curiam); United States v. Green, 722 F.3 d 1146, 1151 (9 th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Day, 7oo F-3 d 713, 716-17 (4 th Cir. 2012); United States v. Wolfe, 701 F. 3 d 1206, 1217-18
(7 th Cir. 2012).
219. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment applies to any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime); S.
Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348-49.
220. Green, 722 F.3d at 1151.
221. See United States v. Ziskind, 471 F-3 d 266, 270 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Vandeberg, 2oi F.3 d 805, 814 (6th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Siegel, 153 F-3 d 1256, 1259-61 (1 ith Cir. 1gg8); United States v.
Ramilo, 986 F.2d 333, 336 (gth Cir. 1993); United States v. Rico Indus., Inc., 854 F.2d 710, 714
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Amendment protections stemmed primarily from the question of whether
restitution has a statutory maximum penalty. After Apprendi, ten circuits
determined that the federal restitution statutes did not contain a maximum
sentence, precluding the Sixth Amendment from applying to criminal
restitution.2 2 2 The Third Circuit sitting en banc articulated the courts' logic
in the most detail:
As we read the statute, once a defendant is convicted of an offense
covered by the VWPA or the MVRA, a district court must (or in the
case of the VWPA, unquestionably may) order restitution, and in
order to fulfill this mandate, the court must determine the amount
of loss pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 3 664 (f) (1) (A). [223]... [W]e see the
conviction as authorizing restitution of a specific sum, namely the
"full amount of each victim's loss"; when the court determines the
amount of loss, it is merely giving definite shape to the restitution
penalty born out of the conviction. Thus, there is no restitution
range under [the statute] that starts at zero and ends at "the full
amount of each victim's losses"; rather, the single restitution amount
triggered by the conviction .. . is the full amount of loss.224
As a result, the court concluded, a judge's calculation of the sum a
defendant must pay in restitution does not "constitute[ ] an increase in
punishment exceeding that authorized by plea or jury verdict, in violation of
the Sixth Amendment."25
Fundamentally, this approach fails to recognize that "f[r] estitution in any
amount greater than zero clearly increases the punishment that could
otherwise be imposed."226 Despite what courts have held, someone has to make
a factual determination as to what the "full amount" is, an inquiry that often
is far from straightforward. For example, the question can arise as to how to
calculate the loss amount-should it be based on current market value of the
stock a person embezzled or the value on the date of loss?227 Or, in the child
pornography context, what is the economic quantity of harm a defendant who
(5 th Cir. 1988); United States v. Sleight, 8o8 F.2d 1012, 1020 (3 d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Bruchey, 81o F.2d 4 5 6, 461 (4 th Cir. 1987). Given restitution's presence in both civil and
criminal proceedings, see supra Part III.B.3.c, some judges continue to reject the notion that
criminal restitution is punitive.
222. See Milkiewoicz, 47o F.3 d at 404; Williams, 445 F-3 d at 1310-11; Reifer, 446 F.3 d at 1 18-20;
Leahy, 438 F-3 d at 337-38; Miller, 49 F.3d at 792-93; Sosebee, 419 F.3 d at 454, 461; Garza, 429 F.3 d
at 170; Bussell, 414 F.3 d at io6o; George, 403 F.3 d at 473; Wooten, 377 F.3 d at 1 144-45.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 3 664 (f)(i)(A) (2012) states: "In each order of restitution, the court shall
order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the
court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant."
224. Leahy, 438 F.3 d at 337-38.
225. Id. at 336-37.
226. Id. at 342-43 (McKee,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 393 F-3 d 1044, 1o51-6o (9 th Cir. 2004) (examining
methods for determining the amount of loss).
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views child pornography causes, but did not know or have direct sexual
contact with the depicted victim? Do losses incurred by a third party count or
not? The "full amount of a victim's loss" is often difficult to quantify, and
almost always requires some type of factual inquiry to ascertain.228
After Southern Union, three of the four circuits to address this question
have continued to reject the Sixth Amendment's application to criminal
restitution on the grounds that "there is no prescribed statutory maximum in
the restitution context"229 Yet, as one dissenting judge noted, "no restitution
can be imposed absent ajudicial determination of the amount of loss."23o For
that reason, the conclusion reached by the majority of circuits is unavailing,
and should not prevent the Supreme Court from providing criminal
restitution with the constitutional protections provided to other forms of
criminal punishment.
B. THE EXCESSIVE INES CLAUSE APPLIES TO CRIMINAL REsTrTuTiON
Criminal restitution has fared better under the Eighth Amendment, but
only slightly. The Excessive Fines Clause "limits the government's power to
extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some
offense."-3' Not many courts have squarely addressed the issue of whether the
Excessive Fines Clause applies to criminal restitution.232 Pre-Southern Union,
three circuits acknowledged criminal restitution fell under the Eighth
22 8 . In crafting its test for determining criminal restitution when multiple defendants in
multiple cases are responsible for a single harm, and in recognizing the possible applicability of
the Excessive Fines Clause to criminal restitution, the Supreme Court in Paroline further
undermines the prevailing circuit view that restitution does not have a "prescribed maximum
penalty." Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1719, 1725-28 (2014); see also supra Part IV.B.
229. United States v. Day, 7oo F.3 d 713, 732 (4 th Cir. 2012); see also United States v.Jajis, No.
13-1430,2014 WL 260321, at*1 (6th Cir.Jan. 24, 2014) (per curiam); United States v. Green, 722
F.3 d 1146, 1150 (gth Cir. 2013) (acknowledging, additionally, the Ninth Circuit's own conflicting
precedent as to whether restitution is punishment). The Fourth Circuit rejects Apprendi's application
to criminal restitution based on its longstanding precedent rejecting criminal restitution as
punishment. United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3 d 1206, 1216-18 (7 th Cir. 2012) (citing "well-
established" and "long-standing" precedent that "restitution is not a criminal penalty").
23o. Leahy, 438 F-3 d at 342 (McKeeJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-1o (1993) (citations omitted).
232. Several circuits have skirted the issue. See United States v. Newell, 658 F.3 d 1, 35 (st
Cir. 2011) ("Even assuming that restitution orders may be challenged under the Excessive Fines
Clause, the restitution ordered in this case" did not violate it). The Third Circuit has avoided
deciding the matter at least twice. First, in a footnote, the court rejected a defendant's claim that
a restitution order was disproportionate to the gravity of his offense as "without merit." United
States v. Graham, 72 F. 3 d 352, 358 n.7 (3 d Cir. 1995). Then, a second time, the court stated,
"[e]ven assuming that mandatory restitution implicates the Eighth Amendment," there was no
violation. United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3 d 185, 205 (3 d Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit seems
to have endorsed the approach that if a restitution order is supported by factual findings made
by the judge at sentencing, there is no analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause. United States v.
Hasson, 333 F. 3 d 1264, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Suarez, 215 F. App'x 872,
879 (1 ith Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit found the issue "insufficiently briefed" to warrant
review. United States v. Beckford, 5 4 5 F. App'x. 12, 16 (8th Cir. 2013).
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Amendment's protections: the Fourth, Fifth and the Ninth Circuits.233
Although the courts rejected the specific challenges to the restitution orders
at issue in each case, each circuit seemed to accept the premise that restitution
is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.2s4 Adopting the test laid out by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Bajakajian,235 a criminal forfeiture case, the
circuits inquired as to whether the criminal restitution ordered was "grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the offense."236
In its recent Paroline decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
criminal restitution may be subject to the constitutional protections of the
Excessive Fines Clause.237 Noting that the clause's aim was to "limit only those
fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government," the Court
nevertheless acknowledged that restitution, although paid to a victim, is
"imposed by the Government at the culmination of a criminal proceeding and
requires conviction of an underlying crime."31R As a result, if a court were to
impose an excessive amount of restitution, that restitution might be "within
the purview of the Excessive Fines Clause."239 It was this concern that led the
Court to reject a child pornography victim's request to hold "a single
possessor [of child pornography] liable for millions of dollars in losses
collectively caused by thousands of independent actors."240
The increasingly expansive and amorphous scope of criminal restitution
cries for constitutional limits on the amount of restitution imposed, as
exemplified by the scenario addressed in Paroline. Because criminal
restitution is now measured by a victim's losses, and includes compensation
for a broad range of tangible and abstract losses, acquitted and unproven
conduct, as well as losses requiringjudges to determine a defendant's relative
culpability, some kind of judicial check on the restitution awards imposed
needs to be present. In fact, by adopting a standard for determining
restitution that allows courts to use "estimation," "discretion[,] and sound
233. See United States v. Dighlawi, 452 F. App'x 758, 760 (9thCir. 2011) (finding restitution
subject to Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment); United States v. Arledge, 553 F-3 d 881,
899 (5 th Cir. 2008); United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3 d 328, 342 (4 th Cir. 2003) (finding
restitution subject to Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Bollin,
264 F-3 d 391, 419-20 (4 th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dubose, 146 F. 3 d 1141, 1144-46 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding criminal restitution subject to Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause).
234. Dighlawi, 452 F. App'x. at 760; Newsome, 322 F.3 d at 342. This test was established in the
contextof inpersonamforfeiture. United Statesv. Bajakajian. 524 U.S. 321, 344 (1998). The Fifth
Circuit implied that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to criminal restitution, but in language
similar to that used in the Sixth Amendment context, concluded that "so long as the government
proved that the victim suffered the actual loss that the defendant has been ordered to pay, the
restitution is proportional." Arledge, 553 F-3 d at 899.
235. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324.
236. Id. at 334; see also Dighlawi, 452 F. App'x at 760; Newsome, 322 F.3 d at 342.
237. Paroline v. United States, 13 4 S. Ct. 1719, 1726 (2014).
238. Id. at 1726.




judgment,"241 in determining a "reasonable and circumscribed award"242 that
accounts for a defendant's "relative culpability,"243 but discourages them from
using a "precise algorithm, "244 or "rigid formula,"145 Paroline has given even
greater weight to the argument that criminal restitution, in its current form,
needs the protections offered by the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause.
Consistent with a view of restitution as punishment, the courts should
extend the constitutional protections that the Sixth and Eighth Amendments
afford to criminal restitution.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time for both the Supreme Court and lower courts to acknowledge
that, on both a theoretical and a practical level, criminal restitution has
become a quintessential element of punishment, and as a result, defendants
must be provided with the constitutional protections that attach to criminal
punishments through the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. The Supreme
Court and lower court rulings that say otherwise are ripe for reconsideration.
241. Id. at 1728-29.
242. Id. at 1727.
243. Id. at 1734.
244. Id. at 1728.
245. Id.
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